Robert
On 28/03/2012 8:42 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
Maybe we should add a statement that device designers must assume that DDoS and other forms of malicious traffic are present on the homenet, as well as a statement that all traffic may be visible to unknown third parties. A sort of generic threat model for homenets. Regards Brian On 2012-03-29 00:20, Robert Cragie wrote:I think there are two orthogonal aspects here. There is one regarding the ability for host to perform end to end communication securely (i.e with integrity and/or confidentiality). This goes without saying and I agree there needs to be a strong statement regarding this. However this is orthogonal to a host's ability to handle all manner of traffic which could be directed to it, especially malicious traffic. Ideally hosts would be able to handle this and the recommendation would still be to require hosts to firewall their own data. When a host is implemented on a platform with plenty of storage and processing power, this is not really an issue. However, in the LLN case, hosts may be running on platforms which have very little storage and processing power by comparison with limited ability to firewall. I do not think we should be precluding these type of devices. Robert On 28/03/2012 6:47 AM, Dmitry Anipko wrote:Brian, I personally would definitely want to see a stronger statement that hosts should be implementing means sufficient to perform end 2 end communication securely on any network, without requiring additional protections from outside. But I guess a few people would then argue that some hosts can't implement the same degree of security protection as the degree e.g. tablets and PC can - and that guess led to the current lanuage. If you think it should be changed to some stronger statement, do you have something specific in mind? -Dmitry ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From:* Cameron Byrne [[email protected]] *Sent:* Tuesday, March 27, 2012 8:29 PM *To:* Brian E Carpenter *Cc:* Mark Townsley; Dmitry Anipko; [email protected] Group *Subject:* Re: [homenet] Security goals On Mar 27, 2012 6:53 PM, "Brian E Carpenter" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 2012-03-28 11:58, Dmitry Anipko wrote:As someone who works for a host software vendor, I'd like to addcouple of points. I agree with Mark that in general the security topic is wider than only filtering on the borders of the realms of the traffic destined to hosts, and I support the efforts to figure out the right set of knobs for the former. That said, for the latter, I'd like to see something along the below lines in the requirements(some of which may already be in the text in some form, putting ithere just for fluency of this piece of the story).1. Homenet hosts MUST implement their own security policies inaccordance to their computing capabilities.I think we know from some famous cases that SCADA systems are highly insecure, mainly due to following this principle (translated as "security is too hard and this device will always be on a private network anyway"). I'm a bit nervous that this policy will encourage low-end device designers to classify their devices as not having enough resource to deal with security.This category should / will be eliminated by market forces, too much liability associated with being willfully insecure. There are famous cases for this too. If internet segmentation is all that is required, there are address types that facilitate local only access. CbBrian _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet_______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet_______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet
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