Joel, The document that I reviewed and provided comment is " http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mglt-i2rs-security-requirements/";
I started to review " draft-mglt-i2rs-security-environment-reqs-00" today, and find out it has the similar Table of content as the "draft-mglt-i2rs-security-requirements-00". What is the intent of the "environment-reqs"? supplement to "i2rs-security-requirement" or be replaced by, or something else? Linda -----Original Message----- From: Joel Halpern Direct [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, August 21, 2015 10:53 AM To: Linda Dunbar; [email protected] Cc: 'Jeffrey Haas'; [email protected]; 'Joel Halpern'; 'Alia Atlas' Subject: Re: [i2rs] draft-mglt-i2rs-security-requirements-00 2 Week WG adoption call (8/17 to 8/31) First, there may be some confusion because the announcement. I presume that you are talking about the -environments documents. If the WG concludes that a different chapter structure is useful, we can of course change it. Given that the goal is environment description, I am not sure your proposed structure is significantly better than the existing one. I believe your comment about the text reading "where security functions may be hosted" is well taken, and we should remove that text when we next revise the document. The isolation text is about the need to keep things separate, and the various possible means are degrees / approaches to separation. Isolation is not about treating things differently, nor is it explicitly about using different protocols. So the point of isolation is not that there are different security requirements, but that in order to avoid corss-effects, things should be kept separate. Yours, Joel On 8/20/15 6:42 PM, Linda Dunbar wrote: > I support the WG adoption because I think the I2RS WG needs it. > However, I hope the authors can consider/address the following > suggestions/comments: > > When you think about the I2RS security, there are following different > aspects: > > -Communication channel between I2RS client and Agent (and the channel > between I2RS client and applications): > > The channel can be > > oVia physical Private network (e.g. within a secured direct connect > within one site), > > owithin one administrative domain, via virtual private network > > oSecured connection, such as TLS or IPSec > > oPublic internet > > o.. > > -Authentication & Authorization > > othe authentication & authorization requirement for different > communication channels can be different. Therefore, should have > separate sections to address specific requirement for each > communication channels between I2RS agent <-> clients (and client <-> > applications) > > The current Section 4 of the draft already has very good description > on the subject. I think 4.4.1 and 4.42 can be separated out of the section. > > -Encryption for the actual content between Client and Agent > > -DoS Design requirement (currently in Section 5.2.1) > > -Management of conflict with other plane (e.g. the management plane, > multi-headed control, which has been discussed extensively in > ephemeral > draft) > > I think the draft should be organized from the aspects of the security > to I2RS as suggested above. > > Here are some detailed questions and comments to the requirements > listed in the document: > > Section 1: > > The second paragraph stated the security recommendations must > "specifying where security functions may be hosted". First of all I > don't see the draft address this aspect. Second, I think "where > security functions are hosted" is orthogonal to "I2RS security" . > > Section 3: > > what does isolating two planes mean? does it mean they have different > security requirement/issues? Or does it mean they need different protocols? > > What are the key differences with regard to the security requirements > for I2RS plane and for management plane? Section 3.1 describes the > interaction between I2RS plane and management plane. But I see the > security requirement for the management plane is similar to I2RS plane . > If you think that they are very different, can you elaborate more? > > Section 3.4 has title "Recommendations", but the content are all > requirements. Why not name the section "Requirement"? > > REQ 2: Does it that a different IP address than the one used by the > management system? > > How is REQ 22 different from REQ 21? > > REQ 27 is hard to enforce. How about say something like "shouldn't > send any information beyond what have been defined by the I2RS data model"? > > REQ 30: simply controlling the resource can hardly prevent DoS. > Malicious client can occupy the resource while the valid one can't access. > > Thanks for consideration, > > Linda > > *From:*i2rs [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Susan Hares > *Sent:* Monday, August 17, 2015 12:50 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* 'Jeffrey Haas'; [email protected]; 'Joel Halpern'; > [email protected]; 'Alia Atlas' > *Subject:* [i2rs] draft-mglt-i2rs-security-requirements-00 2 Week WG > adoption call (8/17 to 8/31) > > This begins a 2 week WG adoption call for > draft-mglt-i2rs-security-requirements. This draft discusses the > security requirements for the I2RS environment. You can find the draft at: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-i2rs-security-environment-reqs- > 00 > > A security reviewer will review this draft during the time 8/20 to > 8/25. We will post the security directorate review to this discussion. > > Sue Hares > _______________________________________________ i2rs mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
