On 8/19/16 9:03 AM, Susan Hares wrote: > Andy/Kathleen: > > > > What do MTI and MTU standard for?
Mandatory to implement / use > > > Sue > > > > *From:*i2rs [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Andy Bierman > *Sent:* Friday, August 19, 2016 11:43 AM > *To:* Susan Hares > *Cc:* [email protected]; Alissa Cooper; Juergen Schoenwaelder; > [email protected]; Kathleen Moriarty; IESG; Jeffrey Haas; Joel > Halpern; Lou Berger; [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) > > > > Hi, > > > > That is simple. > > There needs to be consensus on the syntax and semantics of each > > statement in the YANG module. > > > > Since security is MTI and MTU for NETCONF and RESTCONF, there > > is no point debating which objects are OK without security. > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 7:59 AM, Susan Hares <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Andy: > > > > Thank you for your comments. Perhaps you can provide for the IESG the > list of things that are needed to move a Yang module forward in the IETF. > > > > Sue > > > > *From:*Andy Bierman [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Friday, August 19, 2016 10:24 AM > *To:* Lou Berger > *Cc:* Susan Hares; Juergen Schoenwaelder; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; Alissa Cooper; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; Kathleen Moriarty; IESG; Jeffrey Haas; > Joel Halpern; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) > > > > Hi, > > > > I agree with Juergen. > > There are already too many details that need consensus to move > > a YANG module forward in the IETF. It takes too long already. > > > > We could have been tagging MIB objects all along, but we don't. > > Imagine if there was a debate for every single OBJECT-TYPE macro > > "is this leaf OK for noAuth/noPriv?" > > > > Are there even clear SEC-DIR guidelines on how one would decide this > > debate in a WG? Does SEC-DIR really want to be flooded with review > > requests so they become a bottleneck in YANG RFC publication process? > > > > Standardized insecure access is a big change from what we have done > > for 30 years. There could be a good reason why we left this out of scope > > all this time. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 5:20 AM, Lou Berger <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > Sue, > > My message said three things: > > 1) Juergen's comment resonates with me. > > 2) I think the current text is acceptable. > > 3) I see changing the SHOULD to a MUST as problematic. > I understood one of the other messages on this thread proposing this > change which is what triggered my message. If I misunderstood that > message, feel free to interpret my message as supporting the current > text in question. > > Note that I am only speaking for myself (including in my role as NETMOD > co-chair) and not representing the consensus opinion of any WG. > > Lou > On 8/19/2016 8:07 AM, Susan Hares wrote: >> Lou: >> >> I am clear that Juergen does not want not want to place transport > requirements within the data model for NETMOD. His opinion was > considered in the rough for the I2RS WG. If this requirement is a > problem for NETCONF/NETMOD, the text currently says: >> >> REQ-SEC-09 states: >> >> The default mode of transport is secure so data models SHOULD > clearly annotate what data nodes can be >> passed over an insecure connection. >> >> However, if this means the NETCONF/NETMOD WG will not even entertain > proposal for marking the insecure functions in yang text -- then the two > WG (I2RS/NETMOD) have a problem and should stop this standardization > process going forward. >> >> Sue >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Lou Berger [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>] >> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 7:34 AM >> To: Susan Hares; 'Juergen Schoenwaelder' >> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Alissa Cooper'; > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; > 'IESG'; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Joel Halpern'; > [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) >> >> Sue, >> >> I don't see Juergen as arguing against model access via non-secure > transport. I read his point as that the transport security requirements > don't belong scattered within a data model. >> >> I have to say that from a model complexity (definition, process, > review, implementation - take your pick) , language and NETMOD co-chair > perspective, his comment resonates with me. >> >> I think this makes the key text: >> >> The default mode of transport is >> secure so data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be >> passed over an insecure connection. >> >> >> As this isn't a MUST, I personally think we can live with the text and > we can debate the issue further in the context of specific solutions. I > would strongly object to this being changed to a MUST, or if the > document is changed to make transport (security) requirements identified > within data models a requirement. >> >> Lou >> >> On 8/19/2016 6:49 AM, Susan Hares wrote: >>> Juergen: >>> >>> You have laid out the two options: a) link the data-model to the > non-secure transport, and b) do not link the data to the non-secure > transport. I agree with you that past models did not link past SNMP > MIB data model to the transport. Existing NETCONF models do not link it > to the transport. As you have indicated, you disagreed in the I2RS WG > and we found consensus was to include the non-secure transport. >>> >>> I2RS was created to build things as an interface to the routing > environment. The operators clearly informed the I2RS group of this > need during the requirement setting phase prior to the time I was > chair. The reason I continue to press for this capability is their > input, and the existing use cases I listed previously in this mail: >>> >>> a) public information - BGP route views, >>> b) specific well know up events - such as public-web site up >>> c) specific network service events - interface to particular public > LAN up. >>> >>> As you know, we do not have any I2RS data models that specify this > feature at this time. I suspect after we get through this lengthy > requirement phase, the operators may begin to specify new models that > have this feature. >>> >>> Sue >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder >>> [mailto:[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>] >>> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 4:58 AM >>> To: Susan Hares >>> Cc: 'Alissa Cooper'; 'Joel Halpern'; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; >>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Kathleen > Moriarty'; 'IESG'; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; >>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and >>> COMMENT) >>> >>> I repeat my technical argument: While there may be deployments where > non-secure transports may be reasonable to use, defining these > situations statically as part of data model schemas does not follow > established practices. The IETF has a long tradition of standardizing > data models that can be used in a variety of operational contexts and I > do not see reasons why we should move away from that basic approach. >>> >>> /js >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 02:35:03PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: >>>> Alissa: >>>> >>>> Just a little input you may not know. My background is 15 years > (1995-2010) developing a routing/switching platform (denoted as GateD) > which was sold to over 200 companies. We developed XML and a binary > XML based product that configured this product. It could do 100K > configuration lines and reboot in less than a second on most hardware. > We also provide status messages in secure streams and non-secure > streams. I sold early version of this code to companies that Alia has > worked for - so she has personal viewed the code. At the height of > our work, our development team ran to 50 people which I directed (First > as VP of Engineering, and then as CTO). It is due to this level of > experience that Alia selected me for the co-chair. Russ White has > understood Cisco's process, and has also directed software development > teams for routing. >>>> >>>> In order to freshen my direct experience with I2RS on open source > work, I am working on a publically available work in Quagga based on the > confD product suggested by Cisco. >>>> >>>> In contrast, Juergen is a university professor who has worked on > proto-types. He is not working on an implementation. I hope he will. >>>> >>>> I hope you will consider this background in my response to your > comments below. >>>> >>>> Sue >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Alissa Cooper [mailto:[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>] >>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:54 PM >>>> To: Joel Halpern >>>> Cc: Susan Hares; Juergen Schoenwaelder; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; Kathleen > Moriarty; IESG; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and >>>> COMMENT) >>>> >>>> Jumping in here because this is relevant to my DISCUSS, hope nobody > minds (but if you do, I can go back to the other thread). >>>> >>>>>> On Aug 18, 2016, at 10:30 AM, Joel Halpern > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me try a different take approach to this particular question. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me start by putting aside the question of where things are > marked, and come back to that afterwards. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are a number of cases that I2RS has been asked to cover of > high rate telemetry data. This may be BGP update information, it may be > frequent information about line card activity. There are other cases, > some of which have been documented. >>>>>> >>>>>> While not completely insensitive, the operators have made clear > that they see protecting this data as unnecessary. While I would hope > over time to move to a domain where all of it is protect, that is not > trivial. As the I2RS Architecture points out, it is expected that what > we describe as a single I2RS >communication between a client and agent > is actually associated with multiple channels of communication. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now, if you want to say that the I2RS protocol requirements cannot > allow for unprotected channels, I guess we have disconnect between the > IESG and the WG. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we say that we can allow for unprotected channels, we then get > to the question of which data can be sent over such channels. While > architecturally I agree with Juergen that the model is a bad place to > specify it, the obverse is also true. Not having some limits on what > can be sent unprotected >causes concern about insufficient protection. > If I recall correctly, earlier security reviews called us to task for > being too broad in what we allowed. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, if the IESG wants us to just allow it anywhere, because the >>>>>> model is an awkward place to define the limitation, I can live > with that. What I can't live with is being told both that the model is > a bad place to define it and that there must be restrictions on what is > sent unprotected, without any proposal on how we are to move forward. >>>>> Thank you Joel, this explanation helps me a lot. I think there is a > disconnect about how the restrictions are expressed. From reading the > email traffic about this document, it strikes me that trying to express > the restrictions programmatically doesn’t make much sense in this case. >>>>> I agree with Juergen that it will be challenging to make a judgment > a priori in order to bake a restriction into a data model, because data > that is considered sensitive enough to warrant a secure transport in one > deployment may not be considered sensitive in another deployment. >>>>> So for any data elements where there is any question at all about >>>>> whether they might be sensitive (i.e., any data elements that are > not already routinely made public), I would expect data model authors to > end up indicating that they may be sent over either secure or insecure > transport, which renders the indication not useful. >>>>> Perhaps it would make more sense then to just enumerate in the text > the cases that motivate the inclusion of protocol support for insecure > transport: >>>>> >>>>> 1. For conveyance of information that is already routinely made public. >>>>> 2. For line card activity data where there is no likely upgrade > path to support secure transports in the foreseeable future. >>>>> >>>>> Then the normative requirements would be on clients and agents to > use secure transports unless those clients and agents are deployed where > either of the operational circumstances above necessitate otherwise. >>>>> Alissa >>>> Point 1: >>>> I disagree with Juergen on the difficulty in specifying the sections > of the yang modules. I have provided a suggested solution in: >>>> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hares-i2rs-protocol-strawman-03#section-4.5.2. >>>> >>>> Given the mount schema functionality, we can mount ephemeral state > module which augment non-ephemeral state modules which are "in-secure only". >>>> >>>> Point 2: >>>> I am willing to put an enumeration of the use cases in the protocol > requirement, but I would like to understand the purpose for the > enumeration. We are not doing a use case, but a requirements > document. This information appears to be a "use case" rather than a > technical description. What purpose are you looking for this > enumeration to server. Are you looking for the enumeration in SEC-REQ-08? >>>> >>>> Point 3: Could you review -08.txt on this topic, especially the text > below. Given your comments, I believe I should change the last line to > a MUST. >>>> New/ The default mode of transport is >>>> secure so data models MUST clearly annotate what data nodes can be >>>> passed over an insecure connection. >>>> / >>>> >>>> Sue >>>> >>>> =================== >>>> As to the normative requirements (-08.txt) version: >>>> >>>> Section 3: >>>> >>>> I2RS allows the use of an insecure transport for portions of data >>>> models that clearly indicate the use of an insecure transport. >>>> Operators deploying I2RS must determine if they want to populate and >>>> deploy the portions of the data model which use insecure transports. >>>> >>>> In Section 3.2 in version -08.txt >>>> >>>> SEC-REQ-08: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a >>>> secure transport and optionally MAY be able to transfer data over a >>>> non-secure transport. A secure transport MUST provide data >>>> confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention. >>>> >>>> The default I2RS transport is a secure transport. >>>> >>>> A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or >>>> other operational state that was specifically indicated to non- >>>> confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax. >>>> >>>> The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the I2RS >>>> client SHOULD be done over a secure transport. It is anticipated >>>> that the passing of most I2RS ephemeral state operational status >>>> SHOULD be done over a secure transport. As >>>> [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state] notes, a data model MUST indicate >>>> whether the transport exchanging the data between I2RS client and >>>> I2RS agent is secure or insecure. >>>> >>>> The default mode of transport is >>>> secure so data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be >>>> passed over an insecure connection. >>>> >>>>> Yours, >>>>> Joel >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: Susan Hares [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>] >>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:17 AM >>>>> To: 'Juergen Schoenwaelder' <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> >>>>> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Kathleen Moriarty' >>>>> <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>>; 'The IESG' <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>>; >>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>> Subject: RE: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and >>>>> COMMENT) >>>>> >>>>> Juergen and Kathleen: >>>>> >>>>> Let me proceed with two examples: BGP route views data model and > the event for the web-service data. >>>>> >>>>> The content of these data models are designated as exposed to > public. The routing system only populates the proposed BGP route views > data model with the data destined for the BGP looking glass. The policy > on the routing system indicates what information gets transferred. The > data model is completely available to the public. The Yang Doctors are > going to review this by seeing the whole model is public and available > via non-secure means. >>>>> The security people are going to review this seeing that the whole > model is public, and available via an unprotect means. The fact the > data model is all public should simplify the review. >>>>> >>>>> An event from the I2RS RIB that a web-service route is up is the > second case. The I2RS RIB has an event based on policy that indicates a > web-service route is up. The yang-1.1 doctors must review the content > of the event text to see it does not break privacy or provide too much >>>>> information The event mechanisms will need to work over secure > transport >>>>> and insecure transport. Most of the data will go over the secure > transport event stream. However, a small amount of information may go > over the insecure transport stream. >>>>> >>>>> First, let me know if my use cases are understandable. Second, let > me know if you disagree with this use cases. >>>>> >>>>> Fyi - IESG approved the architecture with the insecure stream. >>>>> >>>>> Sue >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder >>>>> [mailto:[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>] >>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:06 AM >>>>> To: Susan Hares >>>>> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The >>>>> IESG'; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and >>>>> COMMENT) >>>>> >>>>> I just do not know on which basis a data model writer can decide > whether a data object can be exposed in an unprotected way. How are YANG > doctors going to review this? How are security directorate people going > to judge this? But as promised, I leave (still puzzled) now. >>>>> >>>>> /js >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 09:00:14AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: >>>>>> Juergen: >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, we seem to disagree on the value of making it hardwired in > the model. >>>>>> For me, the value is a common understanding of deployment >>>>>> distribution >>>>> such >>>>>> as the route-views. Since the operators argued strongly for this > point, >>>>> I >>>>>> think the best idea is to get it working in code and then see if >>>>>> the deployment matches the requests. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sue >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: i2rs [mailto:[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>] On Behalf Of Juergen >>>>>> Schoenwaelder >>>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 8:14 AM >>>>>> To: Susan Hares >>>>>> Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The >>>>>> IESG'; [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>>>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS >>>>>> and >>>>>> COMMENT) >>>>>> >>>>>> Sue, >>>>>> >>>>>> I still do not see why the 'mode of exposure' of data benefits from >>>>>> being hard-wired in the data model. For me, it is a situational and >>>>>> deployment specific question. But I shut up here since I aired this >>>>>> concern before (and we simply seem to disagree). >>>>>> >>>>>> /js >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 08:07:18AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: >>>>>>> Juergen: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My example is the looking glass servers for the BGP route views >>>>>>> project >>>>>>> (http://www.routeviews.org/) or a route indicating the presence of a >>>>>>> web-server that is public. For the BGP I2RS route, a yang model > could >>>>>>> replace the looking glass function, and provide events for these > looking >>>>>>> glass functions. For the web-server route, an event be sent when >>>>> that >>>>>>> one route is added. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sue >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder >>>>>>> [mailto:[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>] >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 3:32 AM >>>>>>> To: Susan Hares >>>>>>> Cc: 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The IESG'; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>; >>>>>>> [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on >>>>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> COMMENT) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 09:16:48PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: >>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> COMMENT: >>>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Section 3: >>>>>>>>> Can you clarify the second to last sentence? Do you mean there >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>> sections that indicate an insecure transport should be used? >>>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an >>>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly >>>>>>>>> indicate insecure transport. >>>>>>>>> Perhaps: >>>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an >>>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly >>>>>>>>> indicate the use of an insecure transport. >>>>>>> I still wonder how a data model writer can reasonably decide >>>>>>> whether a piece of information can be shipped safely over an >>>>>>> insecure transport since this decision often depends on the >>>>>>> specifics of a deployment >>>>>> situation. >>>>>>> /js >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PS: I hope we do not end up with defining data multiple times (once >>>>>>> for insecure transport and once for secured transports). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH >>>>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | > Germany >>>>>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> i2rs mailing list >>>>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH >>>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany >>>>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> i2rs mailing list >>>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH >>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany >>>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> >>>>> >> >> >> > > > _______________________________________________ > i2rs mailing list > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs > > > > >
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