I fail to understand why it makes a difference whether something is accessed via pub/sub or in a more traditional way. We need to look at this from an architectural point of view. And I am a big fan of the separation of mechanism from policy [1].
The question what can be sent over an insecure transport is a policy decision of a specific deployment and hard-coding such policies statically in a data model scares me. SNMP got this piece right since SNMP left it to the access control subsystem to take the decision and thus policies could be flexible. If there is a need to document common policies that certain applications may find useful, then simply write them down as NACM rules in XML. (The only little issue is that NACM today does not know whether a request came via a non-secure transport since it assumes there are only secure transports. But this seems to be fixable and required to fix if NETCONF indeed introduces non-secure transports.) /js [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_mechanism_and_policy On Tue, Aug 23, 2016 at 03:27:01PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > Jeff: > > Thank you your comments. I agree with your assessment of the WG's desires. > It provides a helpful context for the IESG members. > > As I mentioned in another email, one of the first mechanisms is to describe > what portions of an data model can be sent in the PUB/SUB Push via a > non-secure HTTP session or what require a secure HTTP session. > > Sue > -----Original Message----- > From: i2rs [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Haas > Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 3:46 PM > To: Andy Bierman > Cc: [email protected]; Alissa Cooper; Juergen Schoenwaelder; > [email protected]; Kathleen Moriarty; IESG; Joel Halpern; Lou Berger; > Susan Hares; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) > > I'm lagging in my email, as usual. However, this one caught my eye: > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 07:23:47AM -0700, Andy Bierman wrote: > > We could have been tagging MIB objects all along, but we don't. > > Imagine if there was a debate for every single OBJECT-TYPE macro "is > > this leaf OK for noAuth/noPriv?" > > > > Are there even clear SEC-DIR guidelines on how one would decide this > > debate in a WG? Does SEC-DIR really want to be flooded with review > > requests so they become a bottleneck in YANG RFC publication process? > > I wanted to point out some of the per-object security evaluation that is > already imposed on MIB modules. Consider the following text from RFC 4273: > > : There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that contain > : sensitive information regarding the operation of a network. For > : example, a BGP peer's local and remote addresses might be sensitive > : for ISPs who want to keep interface addresses on routers confidential > : in order to prevent router addresses used for a denial of service > : attack or spoofing. > : > : Therefore, it is important in most environments to control read > : access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of > : these object when sending them over the network via SNMP. > > In some respect, the discussion with regard to I2RS annotation of yang nodes > with security considerations have precedence. It could be done in the > containing documents' security considerations section. It could be part of > the description clause for the node. > > Having some notion of the consideration available as a machine-parseable > markup thus doesn't seem completely unreasonable. > > The essence of your point, Andy, and I believe Juergen's is given a presmise > of "secure by default", is it okay to mark things as "the author of this > module believes this to be okay to be insecure by default"? > > Possibly not. As you both mention, it will depend on the circumstances of a > given operator's deployment. > > The underlying I2RS question is how to mark nodes in such a way that the > insecure transport protocols may be permitted to publish them without > requiring every single node to be audited if you have relatively weak > deployment considerations? If the answer is "read the security > considerations and write a filter", it's not the answer i2rs is looking for. > > > -- Jeff > > _______________________________________________ > i2rs mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs > -- Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> _______________________________________________ i2rs mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
