On Tue, 6 Apr 2010 10:39:22 -0500, Walt Farrell <[email protected]> wrote:

>There is a legitimate integrity exposure involved, and the APAR is properly
>classified as such.  We perhaps should have said a bit more in the
>documentation.  We're considering whether we can do so, and what we can say
>that will convey the magnitude of our concern (though merely the fact that
>we did this via an APAR with mandatory migration actions should serve as a
>indication  that we have serious concerns and there is a legitimate problem
>to address).

Things having quieted down significantly on this topic, I almost hesitate to
reopen this discussion.  However, I did say we would consider whether we
could say any more, and we've done that.  APAR IO12263 is open and contains
the additional information that we can make available.

Quoting from IO12263:
<quote>
The documentation provided with APAR IO11698 is incomplete and  
does not provide sufficient guidance in how to implement the    
System Authorization Facility (SAF) controls introduced in the  
APAR.  The function supplied by IO11698 is not broken and no    
modifications are planned, however, the complete documentation  
provided with IO11698 should have been as follows:

[some information from original documentation omitted from this message for
brevity; see the APAR if you're interested]

However, of all the functions described above,
several need to be controlled very carefully.  Users who are    
granted access to these resources have the potential to         
undermine system security regardless of any data set protections
you may have in place.  Therefore, they should be as trusted,   
for example, as users who have authority to update APF          
authorized libraries.  These functions, and the corresponding   
SAF FACILITY class resources that SMP/E checks, are as follows: 
  Function:                    Resource name:                               
  RECEIVE command    GIM.CMD.RECEIVE                              
  APPLY command        GIM.CMD.APPLY                                
  ACCEPT command     GIM.CMD.ACCEPT                               
  RESTORE command  GIM.CMD.RESTORE                              
  REJECT command      GIM.CMD.REJECT                               
  LINK command           GIM.CMD.LINK                                 
  CLEANUP command  GIM.CMD.CLEANUP                              
  Program GIMZIP        GIM.PGM.GIMZIP                               
  Program GIMUNZIP   GIM.PGM.GIMUNZIP                             
  Program GIMIAP        GIM.PGM.GIMIAP  
</quote>

In addition to a ++HOLD for DOC, the PTF for IO12263 will also have a ++HOLD
for ACTION suggesting that anyone who applied the prior PTF and granted
broad access to SMP/E functions should review those access authorities based
on this new documentation.

-- 
Walt Farrell, CISSP
IBM STSM, z/OS Security Design

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