On 2 Aug 2007 02:24:21 -0700, in bit.listserv.ibm-main you wrote: >Ron Hawkins wrote: >> Clark, >> >> Could this really be a true story? The few boxes that attach to mainframes >> would have triggered a SIM the moment someone unlatched and pulled the drive >> - a highlighted, non-scrolling error message on the console. >> >> And of course the box would have called home to report the failed drive, and >> within an hour or two the CE/FE would have been asking where the missing >> drive canister had gone. >> >> Any computer room worth it's salt would have a log of who had gone in and >> out and the culprit would have been nabbed before you could say >> rumplestiltskin. >> >> A box of spares next to a MF perhaps... Sounds like an urban myth to me. >> >> Ron >> >> PS That would be a hell of a PC running SSA or FCP HBAs. > >No, we use to run HDS dual-SCSI-port drives, as the interface so common >in PCs. <g> > >But seriously: I think it is *much easier* to copy the information than >to steal physical drive modules. If one's datacenter is well protected, >strict RACF and other security rules are enforced, then usually server >room is also well protected. > >Regarding to Timothy's message about encryption - now I understand your >point. "Encryption everything" doesn't mean i.e. SYSRES and SPOOL. <g> >Timothy , you mean all sensitive data, don't you ?
SPOOL can have a lot of sensitive information in readable format. Reading it is not for the technically ignorant. > >Regards >-- >Radoslaw Skorupka >Lodz, Poland ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
