On 5 Aug 2007 13:36:57 -0700, in bit.listserv.ibm-main you wrote: >Clark, > >If it was taken from an Array emulating MF it would be very, very dificult >to read, but it is certainly not encrypted. It would not be useful to the >idiot described in this stolen drive article, but there still is data in the >clear.
I agree that the data is in the clear in the sense that it isn't encrypted. However, the physical drive may not have any pointers on it saying where the logical data is and it is most unlikely that there will be any description of the data. Given the mixture of EBCDIC, packed decimal, possibly compressed data, and other obscurities, it would be interesting to give one of these things to the NSA and see what they could get form it. I agree with your paragraph below. I also suspect getting most application tapes, FDR tapes or DFDSS tapes would give most criminals far less information for far more aggravation than they can get elsewhere. The major find would be a database backup that also has all of the information describing the database. > >If someone was after something very specific on a LUN or volume in a Disk >Array then they would have to steal all the disks in the array group that >are used by the emulated volume, and have a very intimate knowledge of the >how the vendor formats the FBA disk. > >I love to see how they would handle an Array using something like LSF or >Wide Striping. > >Ron > >> rest snipped. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
