On 3/1/2013 4:06 PM, Andy Wood wrote:
Perhaps protection of modules from APF libraries was deemed to be sufficiently important from a system integrity point of view, that they were prepared to endure the trouble caused due to existing load modules with incorrect attributes, while doing it for all load modules would have caused too much disruption to be worthwhile.
(Sorry about the double-post - one of the cats hit my arm at the wrong time).
AFAIK, OS/360 used two subpools for load modules (251, 252), and could have protected the REFR one (although not all system/machine combinations provided protection - I remember clobbering some PCP systems). An irrelevant(?) point is that there were no APF libraries; modules were made permanently resident via a PARMLIB member, and always treated as refreshable.
The closest thing to authorization was the Program Properties Table, for start jobs, and the PASSWORD data set entries usable by any task (and the ADD verb in IEHPROGM was neither privileged nor otherwise restricted!).
Gerhard Postpischil Bradford, Vermont ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
