zSeries doesn't support Protected Key. Oh, wait,you probably *really* meant System z. It's been eight years, time to upgrade your terminology, eh?
On Fri, Apr 26, 2013 at 10:52 PM, Tim Henness <[email protected]> wrote: > It is *theoretically* possible for someone with physical access to the > zSeries processor to open it up and install some customized hardware that > could intercept the clear key. Is that a reasonable risk for the dats you > need to protect, when weighed against the improved performance? For most > customers I would think so. But that is something customers have to weigh > for themselves - with the assistance of their friendly neighborhood auditor! > > Tim > > > On 4/26/2013 8:58 AM, Todd Arnold wrote: > >> So.. even though the protected key starts with the Crypto Express, it >>> wouldn't pass an audit for protection of card data? >>> >> >> Yes, it STARTS with the Crypto Express, but then the cleartext key is >> protected by the fact that it is buried in the inaccessible System z >> hardware which cannot be seen or probed by applications, the O/S, debug >> tools, etc. However, regardless of the fact that the key is inaccessible, >> it does not meet the strict requirements as defined by the standards. As >> an example, here is a piece of the ANSI X9.24 Part 1 standard, which >> defines requirements for handling and managing symmetric cryptographic keys >> in banking applications: >> >> -------------- begin text from X9.24.1 --------------- >> a) Cryptographic keys SHALL only exist in one or more of the following >> forms: >> 1) In a Tamper-Resistant Security Module (TRSM) as specified in >> Section 7.2 below. >> 2) If outside a TRSM, as a cryptogram that SHALL have been created >> inside a TRSM by >> TDEA using a Key Encrypting Key. >> 3) If non-encrypted and outside of a TRSM, a key SHALL exist only in >> one of the following >> forms: >> i) as two or more key components as defined in Section 7.5, >> employing dual control >> and split knowledge or >> ii) as a cleartext key while being transferred from a Key Loading >> Device (KLD) to a >> directly connected TRSM >> -------------- end text from X9.24.1 --------------- >> >> Some clarification of terms in this... >> - A TRSM is a physically secure device which detects any attempt to >> tamper with it and automatically clears all secret data (like keys) >> - TDEA is a synonym for TDES, Triple-DES, which is the only symmetric >> crypto algorithm currently approved for banking applications. >> - "cryptogram" is just a fancy word for a piece of data that is in >> encrypted form. >> - "key components" are values that are combined together to form the >> actual key, such that no component by itself can be >> used to learn anything about the value of the key. (typically, >> components are exclusive-ored together to create the key.) >> - A KLD is a very specialized secure device that can be connected to >> an HSM, Point of Sale terminal, etc. to load keys into it. >> - In standards, the word SHALL means that something is absolutely >> mandatory. >> >> So, this says that any complete key that is not encrypted MUST ONLY exist >> inside a TRSM, which means a physically secure, tamper-detecteing device >> like the Crypto Express. This is what the auditors are measuring the >> systems against. >> >> Todd Arnold >> > > ------------------------------**------------------------------**---------- > For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, > send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN > -- zMan -- "I've got a mainframe and I'm not afraid to use it" ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
