On Tue, 17 Mar 2015 11:19:56 -0400, Tony Harminc <[email protected]> wrote:
>On 17 March 2015 at 10:52, John McKown <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Of course, after this snippet the authorized section cannot trust the >>> contents >>> of any key8 storage. >>> >> >> Yes, I can see how that can be true. Of course, I don't know of a >> _good_ method to ensure memory protection from a "rogue" program which >> runs in the same address space as a trusted program. > >Well there is the key9 scheme (officially >"Storage-Protection-Override") that CICS uses. Whether it's hardened >enough to protect against a malicious -- as opposed to "possibly >erroneous" as the POO puts it -- problem program, I don't know. It's not. It is intended only to protect from incorrectly coded programs, not malicious ones. -- Walt ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
