All, See this thread ...Charles this is the one I spoke about...
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/bit.listserv.ibm-main/tR7c3Pi9pFI/tnp_CEFOh-IJ Regards, Scott On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 10:52 AM, John McKown <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 9:43 AM, Binyamin Dissen > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Of course, after this snippet the authorized section cannot trust the > contents > > of any key8 storage. > > > > Yes, I can see how that can be true. Of course, I don't know of a > _good_ method to ensure memory protection from a "rogue" program which > runs in the same address space as a trusted program. That's why z/OS > UNIX has the concept of a "dirty address space" and you can get some > nasty return codes. That could be considered a plus for doing things > like this using UNIX facilities to fork() a child address space to run > the untrusted program, and only sharing specific memory pages using > UNIX share memory facilities or IAZVSERV. But that then goes back to > the problem of the child needing to access DD statements in the parent > address space. There are always trade offs. Unless you are willing to > go "whole hog" and only use UNIX facilities, including UNIX files > instead of DDs. > > -- > If you sent twitter messages while exploring, are you on a textpedition? > > He's about as useful as a wax frying pan. > > 10 to the 12th power microphones = 1 Megaphone > > Maranatha! <>< > John McKown > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, > send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
