One of the terms bandied about w/r/t B1 security was "covert channels" -- an unauthorized user is not supposed to be able to know anything about another user. "Communication" in this case would include, but would not be limited to, in-memory data.
"Another user" would usually not be the same as "a subsequent step in the same job" but conceivably could be thought of as such. You can decide for yourself to what extent (if any) z/OS Unix could be thought to allow such channels. Maybe Unix (not just on z) brought about the demise of B1 security, I have no idea; I have not heard B1 security mentioned in a long time (that doesn't mean its concepts were bad). Peter Relson z/OS Core Technology Design ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
