On Mon, 23 Jul 2018 21:52:53 -0400, Rob Schramm wrote: >TSO is NOT a good example. The flipping in and out of authorization has >been discussed ad infinitum. Pick something else for discussion points > I consider TSO a good example in that it illustrates a principle that untrusted users should not be given access to those facilities that TSO uses.
>unless we are diverging into what's possible, and there are tons of >inadvisable ways to break mvs integrity. > Here, I'll trust IBM's Statement of Integrity. Nanograms, not tons, and those known are quietly and rapidly being repaired. Social engineering, "magic" SVCs, update access to authorized libraries, ... do not contradict tne SoI, because they do not satisfy its requirements. -- gil ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
