Supervisor state does not automatically bypass security. An authorized routine can play around to do it, but standard code will not.
On Mon, 23 Jul 2018 20:46:54 -0500 Paul Gilmartin <[email protected]> wrote: :>On Mon, 23 Jul 2018 22:53:59 +0000, Seymour J Metz wrote: :>>I hope not, and IBM will take an APAR if it's possible. The one exception is that an unauthorized TSO command can ask the TMP to run an authorized command (or service), but the TMP will set the unauthorized command non-dispatchable for the duration. :>More curious: :>Suppose I use JCL DD, or SVC 99, or BPXWDYN to allocate DD=SYSIN, :>FREE=CLOSE, DISP=DELETE. Then I JCL EXEC or TSO CALL an authorized :>program which OPENs SYSIN for INPUT, READS, and CLOSES it. Will the :>CLOSE free and delete it? Which component, at what point ensures that I :>have RACF permission to delete that data set? :>Similar question for /bin/tso which supports "allocation requests"; environment :>variables containing strings eerily similar to BPXWDYN arguments. The Ref. :>hints but doesn't directly say that /bin/tso invokes BPXWDYN to perform the :>allocations. -- Binyamin Dissen <[email protected]> http://www.dissensoftware.com Director, Dissen Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Should you use the mailblocks package and expect a response from me, you should preauthorize the dissensoftware.com domain. I very rarely bother responding to challenge/response systems, especially those from irresponsible companies. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
