There is an existing draft of a problem statement, so there's at least a 
starting point to consider.  I think discussion about what's needed is probably 
more useful relative to a specific draft than in the abstract:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim-replay-problem/

Scott K

On February 2, 2023 11:26:36 PM UTC, Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote:
>
>On 2/2/23 3:18 PM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
>> the problem statement should just bang out the problems in all their ugly 
>> glory.
>> it should not attempt to suggest solutions, as that would be up to the 
>> working group
>> to hammer out.
>> 
>> (this is my opinion and of course am probably totally off base)
>
>I guess my concern is more along the lines of what solutions *aren't*. There 
>are a bunch of drafts trying to tie the envelope to the email and I think 
>there needs to be a meta discussion of whether that is a good idea or not in 
>general. Frankly that seems like an email architecture question not just a 
>DKIM question. It would be nice to know if there is precedent for that in the 
>larger community and what the implications are. Fwiw, I don't really consider 
>the DMARC "alignment" as tickling the larger question because all it is doing 
>is reporting on it, but a case could certainly be made that it is.
>
>Mike
>
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Feb 2, 2023 at 5:32 PM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>     On 2/2/23 2:16 PM, Tim Wicinski wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>     On Thu, Feb 2, 2023 at 5:07 PM Michael Thomas <m...@mtcc.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>         So here is what sticks in my craw. I think I brought up the
>>>         problem
>>>         statement, but maybe somebody else did before me. It's easy
>>>         to say "here
>>>         is the problem, fix it!" without any context to what any
>>>         proposed fixes
>>>         might break. It would be really bad imo to slap out a minimal
>>>         problem
>>>         statement and then proceed to solutions without any analysis
>>>         of what any
>>>         solution space should and should not do at a protocol level.
>>>         I guess
>>>         that's a little bit more requirement-y, but I'm not exactly
>>>         sure what
>>>         process-wise I'm asking for. DKIM is extremely widely
>>>         deployed so we
>>>         need to be really careful about not breaking existing
>>>         practices or doing
>>>         unnatural acts that have implications to the wider email
>>>         community.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>     My feeling part of the problem statement will be to document
>>>     various solutions
>>>     and how testing should be done and what to look for (breaking
>>>     existing practice would
>>>     be key).
>>> 
>>>     It may be that one solution is protocol rev which works outside
>>>     of current dkim.
>>>     We wrestled with this in the early days of DPRIVE - adding
>>>     additional encryption onto
>>>     DNS was viewed in a similar manner.
>>> 
>>> 
>>     I don't know if there is a formal IETF definitely of what
>>     constitutes a problem statement but it's easy to imagine a problem
>>     statement that... just states the problem. I don't think we have
>>     discussed what should actually be in scope for this problem
>>     statement. I guess we could suss that out before there are chairs,
>>     but obviously we'd need them to make consensus calls.
>> 
>>     Mike
>> 

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