On Thu, May 23, 2024 at 7:44 AM Wei Chuang <wei...@google.com> wrote:

> Just specifically in regards authenticating mailing list modifications:
> fair enough that the ideas should be implemented first before any sort of
> IETF publication for it.  Still there ought to be a place for informal,
> early discussion of ideas on authenticating mailing lists.  For this
> proposal, I think there are issues around the intersection of DKIM signing
> and Content-type, and in particular, there will be advice such as in the
> researcher's blogpost
> <https://www.zone.eu/blog/2024/05/17/bimi-and-dmarc-cant-save-you/> that
> calls for "h=" oversigning the Content-type header to help prevent the
> delimitter modification as was done.  While understandable, I suspect this
> prevents adding a mailing list footer as a new MIME part and perhaps too
> restrictive.  Instead would it be reasonable to say there be sufficient
> protection if the forwarder takes ownership of appended footers?  If not,
> another approach would be to version the Content-type header?  Yet another
> approach would be to resign the DKIM signature by the forwarder, but that
> hides who the sender is causing UI and spam filtering problems.  Going back
> to my original point, would the ietf-dkim list be the right place for this
> cross-cutting discussion?  I think there are a few targeted questions that
> need some discussion.  (We're interested prototyping but that's at least a
> quarter or so away)
>

I think this is a fine place to have the discussion.  Or at least I can't
think of a better one.

I've read the middle part a few times and I don't understand either the
attack or the proposed mitigation, so I think some examples might help.
Taking a multipart message that signs (but does not oversign) Content-Type
in order to add a footer or something would still invalidate the message
because the body would be different, even near the top (within any "l="
that is not zero).  That's also true for adding Content-Type that wasn't
there; the top of the message would need to change.

-MSK
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