On Sat, 2006-04-29 at 14:40 -0400, John L wrote: > Since we don't know what the arguments to r= mean, I don't understand why > r=xxx is better than xxx._domainkeys.foo.org, in both cases with an xxx > that means nothing unless you happen to have a side agreement with the > sender.
The text for the r= parameter indicated that as the number increases, the recommended annotation levels made by the signer also increase. With a selector, relative assurances do not exist. A selector for this purpose also requires that key selection be tied to the level of the recommendation, where it may be simpler to add this as an independent parameter, especially when messages are being signed at the MTA. > More to the point, systems to evaluate the reputation of a sender or > signer are utterly, completely out of scope for the DKIM project. The assurance being made by the signer has _nothing_ to due with reputation. This r= parameter relates to annotation recommendations made by the signing domain for a particular message. Within a particular domain, some sources of messages will be considered by the signing-domain as more trustworthy than others. Only the signer can reasonably make this indication. With this parameter, the recipient must still trust the signer, but the signer also indicates their level of trust for the source, thus increasing security. Perhaps this message is to inform customers about the availability of recommended browser plug-ins. It would be important for a responsible signer that these messages not be confused with other messages that might also be signed, but are from less well vetted sources. Until conventions are established, perhaps a general guideline could be initially established of not offering elevated annotations for messages with an r= level below 6. > As we keep reminding ourselves, a valid signature from foo.org means > no more or less than "you can blame foo.org if you don't like this." This parameter is _not_ about reputation, it is about improving security. This r= parameter is a recommended trust-level annotation for a message from an otherwise trusted, well-known domain. Few, if any, domains should be considered to only sign message from sources given uniform vetting. Whether this is a financial institution or a large ISP, there are some sources within these domains that should _not_ be annotated with a uniform level of trust. The r= parameter allows the signer a method to inform the recipient the level of trust the sender recommends for the source of the message. This r= parameter should prevent a practice of inventing oddly named domains that attempts to make the same distinctions that can be far more safely made using the r= parameter. This parameter is not about reputation, this is about safety and security. -Doug _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
