Michael Thomas wrote: > FWIW, I don't think that t=testing is at all helpful either.
+1 It also muddies the water for the Authentication-Results, if they map e.g. "strict deny" to "hardfail" and "all process" to "softfail" there's nothing left for any "strict testing". > It's that sort of subjective state that we should both learn > from SPF and avoid. Yes, IMO the SOFTFAIL "testing" wasn't a good idea, one of the many SPF battles I lost. Some folks really like it, a FAIL is a difficult decision for the known reasons wrt SPF or PRA. A "strict deny" SSP is also a difficult decision. But this "testing" loohole doesn't help receivers, a sender policy (or a published signing practice) must make sense for *receivers*. Frank _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
