Daniel Black wrote: >> So I suggest we update the DKIM MLM draft to take out all the stuff about >> signatures surviving lists, and just say that if it's important for your >> signature to survive, > > The DKIM standard has gone a long way to ensure interoperatibility and the > ability to survive canonicalisation changes, header field additions and is > careful about which header fields are recommended for signing purely based on > survivability. Taking an approach saying we don't care if DKIM survives MLMs > is a step in the opposite direction. This is not a proposal I support.
I know this is background noise, but I have no interest in restoring broken signatures or passing on ones we broke. Aren't people tired of dealing with iffy iffy mail? If so, why contribute to it with even more iffy iffy mail? Maybe we should come up with a new idea called DKIM Amplifiers (DKIM-AMP) whose purpose is to restore the signal strength of DKIM signatures from hop to hop, from resigner to resigner. Maybe we should have a new DKIM-PREDICT, whose purpose it allow the source point to create a PREDICTED PATH header on how mail will travel. DKIM-PREDICT learns by looking at Received lines and sending feedback to the source point, providing tips on the ORCP (OBSERVED RECEIVED COMMON PATH). Maybe we should have a new DKIM-FUZZY, whose purpose is to allow for non TRUE or FALSE conditions or MAYBES, wait, we already have a DKIM-FUZZY framework. :) Seriously, this stuff is really complex - anyone who says this is easy stuff to implement, well ............ Sure it is easy to sign - if you don't care what was there to be begin with. Sure it is also easy to verify - but what is the end result of that? A continuation of iffy iffy mail world with the biggest beneficiaries - the BAD GUYS who will continue to do nothing to remain in a iffy iffy mail world. Again, just background noise. :) -- Hector Santos, CTO http://www.santronics.com http://santronics.blogspot.com _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
