On Sep 15, 2010, at 12:11 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote: > Based on that (rather precise) description, aren't ADSP's requirements a > proper subset of the DKIM requirements? If so, I'm not sure I agree with > "badly conflicting", but it does frame future discussion quite nicely. > > For example, if DKIM enables the identification of mail streams, isn't the > one ADSP covers just a specific instance of a mail stream? >
BTW, one thing I think we can agree on and find value from in these pre-deployment email discussions is terminology. I ran into a problem at the last MAAWG during a panel discussion where my understanding of "3rd-party signature" is what someone else meant by "2nd-party signature". What is the real definitions of "1st-party", "2nd-party" and "3rd-party" signatures in the context of DKIM and ADSP, i.e. in the context of i= and d= and from: values? > ________________________________________ > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] On > Behalf Of Steve Atkins [[email protected]] > Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2010 3:01 PM > To: DKIM List > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault > > The problem is that the two things have badly conflicting requirements. DKIM > is based on a domain-based identifier that's independent of the From: domain, > and that's where much of it's value comes from. ADSP is based on a > domain-based identifier that must remain identical to the From: field at all > times, and that's where it's sole value comes from. ADSP intrinsically > conflicts with the original design case for DKIM, despite being piggy-backed > on to it. > > So any document that puts forth even basic good practices for DKIM usage for > monitoring sender reputation (use d= to differentiate mail streams) is going > to be anathema to ADSP requirements (d= must be the same as the From: domain). > > And any ADSP-driven set of requirements (mailing lists should not only > re-sign any mail they re-send, they should alter the From: address to match) > is going to be considered nonsensical by people who consider DKIM a way to > tie an identity cookie to a message. > > And, as we've seen, any compromise document is hated by pretty much everyone, > even assuming you can get there. > > Cheers, > Steve > > _______________________________________________ > NOTE WELL: This list operates according to > http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
