On 18/Oct/10 20:50, Dave CROCKER wrote: > There is a premise that is motivating the proponents of giving instructions to > MUA designers about DKIM outcomes. The premise is that providing DKIM > information will be useful, and possibly that providing /more/ DKIM > information > will be more useful. (There is also some unfortunate vagueness about the > actual > meaning of some of this information.)
Providing DKIM information /will/ be useful. Only the second part is probably wrong, because a signature cannot do more than validate. > As a small example of how peculiar the current line of advocacy is, I'll > suggest > a simple example: > > Alice sends Bob a message. > > Alice diligently signs all the right header fields and all of the body. I think Dave gave a deceptive description on purpose, to check whether we still confuse DKIM and S/MIME. If we're talking DKIM, the subtle difference between author and author domain characterizes the signing. > Bob's MUA is sophisticated and up to date, so it displays the message > with > this extra information about the "validity" of the message. > > What is the actual value of this marking, given that Alice is really a > spammer? IMHO the goal is distinguishing between two categories of spam, tractable and intractable. More precisely, two categories of /messages/ --DKIM knows nothing about spam. Bob knows that in case he complains he will probably be listened with the diligence that Alice's domain is reputed for: That's the actual value of the marking. Please reply to [domainrep]. _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
