On 19 May 2011, at 18:19, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] 
>> On Behalf Of Ian Eiloart
>> Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2011 3:21 AM
>> To: John Levine
>> Cc: <[email protected]>
>> Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] New canonicalizations
>> 
>> Probably true, but if the difference between 10% broken and 8% broken
>> signatures is independent of whether the email is spam, then actually
>> "relaxed" seems to be producing a 20% reduction in signature breakage.
>> 
>> I'd argue that a 20% reduction in broken signatures *is* actually "much
>> better".
> 
> That statistic is largely meaningless unless there's a basis for comparison.  
> For example, it would be useful to observe that the same message, sent with 
> each of the four canonicalizations, to the same set of destinations using the 
> same endpoint software, produced different results given that one changing 
> variable.  But if domain X only ever tried sending with relaxed/relaxed and 
> generally gets good results, there's nothing in that datum to say that 
> simple/simple would not have worked just as well for the same sender with the 
> same mail.  Thus I don't believe there's enough data to support your 
> conclusion.

Well, nor do I really. I'm just pointing out that IF IF IF the 10% and 8% 
figures are real then it's the 10% and 8% that you need to be comparing (that's 
a 20% improvement) not the 90% and 92% (a trivial improvement).

However, someone else pointed out that spammers and non-spammers seem to have 
similar patterns of using simple and relaxed. If that's the case, then we've 
eliminated one potential problem with the data.

> That relaxed/relaxed appears to survive 20% more might be based on the fact 
> that the people using it send clean mail through clean paths, and it's as 
> simple as that.

True. Though I've found that maybe one third of messages that I see with a bad 
signature also carry a good signature. 

>> To determine that, we'd need a pareto analysis of breakage modes.
>> Presumably lists that aren't re-signing are responsible for some of
>> this, as are broken signing mechanisms. The questions remaining are,
>> "is there anything left after excluding those two cases?", and "how
>> much of that could be fixed easily?".
> 
> Our stats are unable to tell what the problem is in all cases, but for mail 
> we've received where the signer used the "z=" tag, the biggest signature 
> breaker in terms of header changes is modified To: fields.  I suspect that's 
> either rewriting by lists to add the list description as a comment, or 
> improperly quoted comment fields that are corrected along the way.

For May, so far, I see these canonicalisations for good signatures:
206136 c=relaxed/relaxed
55748 c=relaxed/simple
   1 c=simple/relaxed
29207 c=simple/simple

I also see these problems:
5816 invalid - public key record (currently?) unavailable
        364 signing domains
3772 invalid - syntax error in public key record
        93 signing domains


And these for bad signatures:
22577 c=relaxed/relaxed (9.9%)
        but 6087 (27%) of these are from yahoogroups.com, and almost all also 
carry a good signature!
4065 c=relaxed/simple (6.7%)
   6 c=simple/relaxed 
3094 c=simple/simple (9.6%)

And these are the failure reasons:
simple/simple:
1992  body hash mismatch (body probably modified in transit)]
1102  signature did not verify (headers probably modified in transit)]

relaxed/simple:
2796  body hash mismatch (body probably modified in transit)]
1269  signature did not verify (headers probably modified in transit)]

relaxed/relaxed:
1824  body hash mismatch (body probably modified in transit)]
20753  signature did not verify (headers probably modified in transit)]

d=yahoogroups.com:
  9  body hash mismatch (body probably modified in transit)]
5949  signature did not verify (headers probably modified in transit)]
-- 
Ian Eiloart
Postmaster, University of Sussex
+44 (0) 1273 87-3148


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