On 25/02/2012 13:07, Stephen Farrell wrote:
...cut... nor had they thought about any
privacy-friendly ways to handle identifiers in
log files that might be exchanged between domains.
As part of the recently completed EC TAS3 project we considered this and
implemented a (partial) proof of concept. This uses the Liberty Alliance
scheme of passing encrypted PIDs between SPs. But the process is very
unwieldy and gets very complex once a log record refers to the PIDs of
several different entities, each of which has a different PID at each
SP. So it is not a system that I would especially recommend
regards
David
It'd have been great to be able to say "go look
at RFC xxxx where it shows you ten possible ways
to do that."
S
[1] http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sipclf-problem-statement/
On 02/24/2012 10:33 PM, David Chadwick wrote:
Hi Klaas
I agree with you. It might that IRTF is more appropriate for some work
items, but this is something the ADs can decide
regards
David
On 24/02/2012 18:56, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
Hi Hannes,
Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that there is a bit too much
focus on what is possible with *todays* technology. I would rather
like to focus on properties we would *like* to see, and possibly work
on those in the IETF (but most likely other fora).... But still that
is probably not for a terminology document, but I do think we need to
be able to express all desirable properties using the terms from the
terminology document.
Klaas
Sent from my iPad
On 24 feb. 2012, at 19:47, Hannes
Tschofenig<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi David,
this specific case seems to have pretty tough privacy requirements:
you want to avoid having relying parties to know who the identity
providers are AND also want to avoid letting identity providers
know which relying parties data subjects talk to AND finally you
want to avoid collusion among relying parties to learn more about
data subjects.
It is interesting to see how a set of privacy requirements produce
a system that has questionable privacy properties...
Ciao Hannes
PS: Whenever one talks about trust it is useful to mention 'who is
trusted by whom to do what'.
On Feb 22, 2012, at 12:37 AM, David Chadwick wrote:
On 20/02/2012 17:16, Rhys Smith wrote:
On 15 Feb 2012, at 06:06, [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
Well, even more, the idp should not know at all which rp I
talk to in the first place.
It is a strong privacy reqirement. Ｉdoubt solutions in ABFAB
can provide this feature.
Yes, ABFAB cannot do this natively.
Though there are always ways around this. SAML cannot do this
natively either, but the Cabinet Office (UK government) is in
the middle of setting up a national federated infrastructure
with exactly this properly, which it achieves by having a
gateway in the middle which mediates all traffic.
Hmmm. the design of this is very questionnable (and opaque). Full
trust must be given to the gateway, without any assurance that it
is trustworthy. It is not even mentioned in the trust assurance
document.
regards
David
Note that this privacy requirement may well be asymmetric -
there may be a difference between the IdP not being able to
know about which RP the user is using, and the RP not knowing
which IdP the user came from...
R. -- Dr Rhys Smith Identity, Access, and Middleware
Specialist Cardiff University& Janet - the UK's education and
research network
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