At 10:05 PM 12/7/99 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

>Tripp Lilley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > I don't think NATs are architecturally "correct", but I think they're
> > teaching us an important lesson about the (initially valid) assumptions
> > about end to end connectivity. Even after we eradicate NATs through
> > wholesale migration to v6 (optimist hat on), the paranoid will still
> > deploy ALGs on their firewalls to mediate access to those globally
> > routable lightbulb and security camera addresses.
>
>I'm not sure that's the right model, actually. IP addresses are too
>easy to forge. The right way to stop people from doing that sort of
>thing is to deploy end to end security protocols that strongly
>authenticate both ends.

Anythink mankind can lock, mankind can unlock. You will never get
rid of firewalls. At least not in our lifetimes.

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