I'm not going to play any more.
Brian
Sean Doran wrote:
>
> Fuel for the B Ark...
>
> Brian Carpenter writes:
>
> | Sorry, this makes no sense at all. There is no way to "restrict"
> | certain types of domain name that has any meaningful effect
>
> Eh? I can assure you that my colleagues and I will defend the
> brand value of, for example, ebone.net, by only delegating subdomains
> to Approved Entities. I am sure this is true of IBM.COM, and could
> be true of a hypothetical owner of e.g. kids.tm or .kids.
>
> Likewise, I can assure you that two of the national top level domains
> I have history with vigorously and assiduously "restrict" access
> to their TLDs according to policies established by the "owners"
> of the rights in that TLD as identified by the IANA.
>
> "Defend" here also implies -- and in some cases has meant --
> actual removal of the subdomain delegation entirely when
> the "brand rules" (or TLD rules, where the TLD is effectively a brand)
> are violated.
>
> | given the absence of international jurisdiction, and IP addresses
> | relate to network topology not to content
>
> It's very simple - if you want a piece of my "branded" TLA,
> you have to be logically connected to my network. In order
> for that to occur, you first and foremost have to agree to
> my brand's rules, and secondly have to have a virtual connection
> to my TLA, or in a CIDR sense, you have to be able to announce
> subnets. This *is* done with IPv4 now -- in fact, IBM itself
> announces various subnets of 4.0.0.0/8 (e.g. 4.22.193.0/24)
> and 9.0.0.0/8 (e.g. 9.2.0.0/16, 9.3.4.0/24, 9.3.5.0/24 (why not aggregate?),
> 9.20.0.0/17, ...). Presumably the ASes originating the longer
> prefixes have negotiated with and gotten an OK from the entities
> delegated the original covering prefixes.
>
> If we can make that last assumption -- that any globally announced
> holes blown into a CIDR-style prefix have an OK from the "owner"
> of the TLA -- then surely those holes and anything abstracted by
> using logical connectivity rather than announcing longer prefixes
> count as "restricting the address space".
>
> Obviously this is a fine thing to fit into the next revision of
> draft-ietf-ipngwg-default-addr-select-01.txt, since IPv6 has
> the cool property of multihoming-done-by-source/dest-address-pair-
> selection, and clearly [SELECT] should say that kids-safe end
> systems (e.g., in classrooms, at libraries) MUST always prefer
> a kids-safe prefix, even if using that kids-safe prefix is
> not the optimal choice in terms of fewest hops, shortest delay,
> highest availability, lowest loss, or some other metric.
>
> | so they can't be used
> | in this way, whatever misapprehensions some of the commission members may
> | be under.
>
> No, no, they are really on to something. They should push for:
>
> 1/ a formal policy that makes a string of numbers an
> item of intellectual property (following 1-800-FLOWERS example)
>
> 2/ an entity which is "kids safe" to be granted sole use
> of a particular IPv6 routing prefix, and which will advertise
> the existence of this "kids safe" prefix to all and sundry,
> and will facilitate the use of addresses from within the prefix
> by approved "kids safe" hosts, by -- including but not limited to --
> i/ forming a virtual topology to which "kids-safe" hosts, sites,
> or ISPs can connect (a la 6bone)
> ii/ negotiating with ISPs the carriage of globally-visible
> subnets of the "kids-safe" prefix in some future "native"
> IPv6 internet, if and only if the "kids-safe" protection
> body approves the delegation of a complete subnet
>
> 3/ the adoption by the IETF of a "pre-fabricated" source/destination
> address pair selection algorithm which will at the very least:
>
> -- always choose the "kids-safe" source address
> (when sending SYNs to web servers, for example)
> -- raise an alarm or reject connections which are
> not to or from a "kids-safe" source or destination
>
> It is very clear that IPv6's approach to multihoming is infinitely
> superior to IPv4 + CIDR's multihoming scheme, and I am glad to see
> that even politicians recognize the opportunities that arise as
> a result of this wonderful new technology.
>
> Sean.
