Thanks for your response, Len. Your stats are impressive, indeed, and your
point regarding blocking spam at the envelope level using a small box (850
MHz CPU, 512 MB RAM) running IMGate is well taken. However, I am still
wondering *theoretically* about emulating my employer's sendmail
configuration using IMail Server alone as I stated in my original post.

You are right in saying that the "counter-attack" that was implicit in my
posting is not nearly as effective as what you described. But then, I said
it was a theoretical question involving IMail only.

Regards,

Guy
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Len Conrad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 17:54
Subject: Re: [IMail Forum] Faking acceptance/validation of VRFY and RCPT TO:



>I am certainly not advocating the use of the "nobody" alias. Rather, I am
>asking how to configure IMail so that it *seems* to accept all mail and
>silently drop messages to invalid recipients and respond to VRFYs so that
it
>*seems* to validate non-existent recipients. The underlying idea is to
fight
>address harvesters

With sufficient defenses to block 95% of spam, one really doesn't care if
your accounts are  harvested, simply because knowing a valid recipient is
hardly enough for a spammer to get his spam delivered to the recipient.

What really hurts about address harvesting is the long-term, high-volume
simultaneous STMP sessions from the attack and the resources it takes to
reject them.  Yeah, you see the harvester attacking and you want him to
stop (you can�t and he won't), you want to punish/trick/kill him (you
can't).

But once the MX is hardened against that harvesting DoS, as you see here:

Per-Hour Traffic Summary
     time          received  delivered   deferred    bounced     rejected
     --------------------------------------------------------------------
     0000-0100       15950       1235         47         18      34007
     0100-0200       11813       1142         43         10      20434
     0200-0300        8195       1135         39         10       8133
     0300-0400       11043        968         58         15      15873
     0400-0500        9143        904         45         13       9447
     0500-0600       10577        857         37         18      13936
     0600-0700        9726        877         20         13      11726
     0700-0800        9918        953         47         18      11656
     0800-0900       18136       1120         67          7      39762
     0900-1000       27345       1176         62         87      69738!!!!!
     1000-1100       20327       1451         82         16      37466!!!!!
     1100-1200       17339       1384         77         27      30840
     1200-1300       12450       1220         49         17      21207
     1300-1400        8818       1393         94         10      10969
     1400-1500       10126       1240         99         13      13141
     1500-1600       10689       1204         65         16      15717
     1600-1700       11726       1146         88          8      18617
     1700-1800        3847         90          0          3      10094
     1800-1900           0          0          0          0          0
     1900-2000           0          0          0          0          0

... where the bulk of the rejects are stopped by IMGate as being to unknown
users:

       1 ACL mta_clients_onedict
       2 ACL mta_clients_relay
       2 SMTP invalid [EMAIL PROTECTED]
       3 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after MAIL
       3 ACL [EMAIL PROTECTED]
       3 ETRN Mail theft attempt
       4 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after HELO
       7 ACL from_senders_clueless
      12 ACL mta_clients_senders_regexp
      15 Other
      24 SMTP unauthorized pipelining
      27 ACL helo_hostnames
      29 SMTP invalid [EMAIL PROTECTED]
      44 ACL mta_clients_slet
     107 ACL to_recipients_dead
     156 ACL mta_clients_blaksender
     166 ACL mta_clients_bogus
     195 ACL unauthorized relay
     210 ACL to_local_recipients unknown recipient
     419 ACL from_senders_nxdomain
     739 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after DATA
     799 ACL mta_clients_dead
     919 ACL from_senders_black
     953 DNS timeout for MTA PTR hostname (forged @sender.domain)
    1116 SMTP sender address verification in progress
    2089 ACL from_senders_slet
    3618 DNS no A/MX for @sender.domain
    4051 ACL from_senders_black_regexp
    4249 ACL mta_clients_bw
    4537 RBL rbl-plus.mail-abuse.org
    4739 ACL from_senders_imgfx
    5184 SMTP sender address undeliverable
    6421 DNS nxdomain for MTA PTR hostname (forged @sender.domain)
   12961 SMTP sender address unverifiable
   95377 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after RCPT  <<<<<<<<<<<
  339041 ACL to_relay_recipients unknown recipient  <<<<<<<<<<
===========================
  488222 TOTAL

The IMGate machine is an 850 MHz PIII with 512 MB RAM.  During these
attacks, it hardly breaks a sweat due to the efficiency of the rejection
mechanism.  The mailbox server of course sees nothing.

I haven't found any great advantage, even any advantage, in trying to
counter-attack.  The harvesters get a few, even all, of your addresses, so
what?  The spammer trying to deliver to a valid account still has to get
through all the anti-spam defenses, and when those are working well, he
will still be rejected.

btw, all you people who think AOL and I are totally BOFH nutz for wanting
to blanket block  dsl/cable/DUL subnets and PTR subdomains, here's the IPs
and PTR hostnames where the above attacks are originating:

Host/Domain Summary: SMTPD Connections (top 30)
  connections  time conn.  avg./conn.  max. time  host/domain
  -----------  ----------  ----------  ---------  -----------
     7297       22:03:40         11s       249s   attbi.com
     6432       16:28:08          9s       261s   comcast.net
     3062        3:33:21          4s       164s   swbell.net
     2699        1:43:17          2s        11s   mail.cgocable.ca
     2581       11:22:11         16s        94s   t-dialin.net
     2154        1:25:05          2s        13s   intellispace.net
     2136        3:52:04          7s        77s   bezeqint.net
     2103        5:21:37          9s        45s   203.126.110.34
     2082        5:19:32          9s       103s   rr.com
     2031        2:06:20          4s        33s   relais.videotron.ca
     2008       15:42:34         28s        49s   213.33.101.19
     1868       17:21:48         33s       285s   rima-tde.net
     1780        9:09:16         19s       272s   dsl-verizon.net
     1652        1:32:55          3s        79s   <mycustomer>.net mailbox
server outbound!!!!
     1598        7:24:27         17s       257s   adelphia.net
     1480        9:22:13         23s       249s   prodigy.net.mx
     1480        4:36:10         11s       257s   bbtec.net
     1419        4:44:37         12s        85s   charter.com
     1373        4:15:49         11s       253s   btopenworld.com
     1259        7:25:02         21s       143s   verizon.net
     1232        1:21:26          4s        67s   tpcper.com
     1202        7:29:48         22s       102s   212.174.227.129
     1199        0:50:54          3s        34s   cox.net
     1138        0:51:55          3s        12s   mx.kis.lt
     1123        1:24:39          5s       244s   optonline.net
     1119        1:48:16          6s        20s   203.98.174.196
     1076        1:34:29          5s       262s   211.162.0.131
      994        3:12:25         12s       251s   61.159.235.36
      931        0:45:15          3s        72s   telus.net

yep, the report cuts off at the "Top 30", and we are still at 1000
connects/MTA at that point, which is only through 17:00 hours.  Note that
his mailbox server (5000 accounts) has connected only 1650 times to send
outbound mail, and the big ISPs (assume legit mail) of AOL, MSN, Earthlink
didn't make the Top 30 MTAs.

Now try to tell me and AOL that this ISP should avoid blanket blocking of
cable/dsl/dialup and dynamic subnets so he can accept 0.0001% legit mail
from a tiny number of legit DSL mail servers.  What kind of percentage play
is that?

Len


_____________________________________________________________________
http://MenAndMice.com/DNS-training: New York; Seattle; Chicago
IMGate.MEIway.com: anti-spam gateway, effective on 1000's of sites, free



To Unsubscribe: http://www.ipswitch.com/support/mailing-lists.html
List Archive: http://www.mail-archive.com/imail_forum%40list.ipswitch.com/
Knowledge Base/FAQ: http://www.ipswitch.com/support/IMail/

Reply via email to