DNS Poisoning Requested From Providers by Rights Organisation http://constitutionalcode.blogspot.com/2005/07/dns-poisoning-requested-from- providers.html
The German rights organisation for composers, lyricist and publishers, GEMA, has asked 42 access providers to poison their DNS servers in order to block sites that provide links to eDonkey files. In short, DNS poisoning obstructs the process of converting a URL to a numeric IP address. The GEMA apparently expects the access providers to configure their DNS servers so that "inquiries by end-users are not passed to the correct server, but to an invalid or another pre-defined side." The GEMA also demands that the providers sign a testimony,with which they commit themselves to ensure full blockage under a contractual penalty of 100.000 euro if any of their customers can still reach the targeted site after July 25th. There's a good reason for the GEMA to target access providers. These are located at the end of the internet chain (source-ISP-"internet"-ISP-user), and usually fall within the (German) jurisdiction, which eases enforcement. However, the effectiveness of this measure may be questioned: users can still enter the numerical IP address of the sites (URL-IP address converters are easily available on the net), and other DNS servers may be used. The GEMA probably thinks that an average user may not be able to take these steps. It also has high expectations of the ability of providers to block the sites, or at least of providers in general, setting a huge sum of 100 000 euro for failure to comply. The providers in question are still doing their legal evaluations of the request, or have said right out not to comply, because the GEMA is not the kind of judicial instance that can set these kinds of demands. They're considering to bring GEMA's actions to court, in order to see if GEMA has any standing. This question, and GEMA's actions that propel it, are a sign of the times: private parties (rightholders) seeking direct enforcement through private parties (ISPs), stripping down the constitutional protection of speech from the largest (third) private party (users). In the Pennsylvania child pornography case, slightly reminiscent of this one, new legislation allowed the government to aks access providers to block sites, using DNS poisoning amongst others. In that case there was a law to challenge, constitutional restraints to invoke, a court to review the pressure put on the public (government) - private (users) relationship. While laws may be applicable in the German case, users could "constitutionally" loose out if private demands are enforced by private parties. A judicial review is appropriate here, if for one thing, to test how far decisions to block the information flow can be pushed and taken within the private realm. Even if there's arguably illegal activity involved. Because there always is....arguably. You are a subscribed member of the infowarrior list. Visit www.infowarrior.org for list information or to unsubscribe. This message may be redistributed freely in its entirety. Any and all copyrights appearing in list messages are maintained by their respective owners.
