------ Forwarded Message

From: "Fred R. Goldstein" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

As had been rumored, the FCC today adopted the Petitions for Forbearance
that some large ILECs had earlier filed, and reclassified DSL as an
information service, not Telecommunications Service.  Subject to a one-year
transition period, DSL will be detariffed and ILECs will no longer be
required to offer it to ISPs.  This, presumably, gives those ISPs'
customers time to change their email addresses.

Democratic Commissioner Copps went along with Martin, saying that he felt
that the Supreme Court's Brand X ruling weakened the ISPs' case.  He said
he personally agreed with Scalia's dissent, but saw his position
weakened.  As such he felt happy to get some trade-offs of his own into the
Decision.  The details are not out, but Copps, a noted conservative on many
social issues, seemed happy that CALEA requirements will now be applied to
broadband ISPs.  The Commission also adopted a position statement, but not
a rule, about what they expected Internet content to be.  Therefore ISPs
may be content-regulated in the future under Title 1, something heretofore
considered unthinkable.

ISPs are now in a very difficult situation that presumably calls for
extreme legal action.  I can see two different lines of attack.  IANAL so
this is legally speculative, so take it for what it's worth.

One attack is antitrust.  The Trinko case held that ILECs cannot be sued
for Antitrust if they legally gained a monopoly; it held that the Telecom
Act is the controlling law for removing that monopoly, even though the
Telecom Act has a clause leaving antitrust in place.  Now in this case, the
ILECs had roughly a 0% share of the broadband ISP market, and not much more
of dialup, at the time the Telecom Act was enacted.  ISPs took advantage of
the Computer Inquiries rules (which the FCC abolished today) to purchase
Telecommunications from LECs.  When the LECs offered captive ISP services
over DSL, they had to purchase the same underlying tariffed services from
their regulated affiliates.  Now, under today's ruling, the ILECs, who have
a very large share (>80%) of the ISP-over-DSL market and a large share
(~40%?) of the broadband ISP market in general (cable being somewhat
larger), stand to use their new power to take over the remaining share of
the DSL ISP business.  Since this is *not* an existing monopoly, and since
it is based on using their extreme market power in the wire business to
monopolize an industry that they were once not even a player in, it strikes
me as ripe for antitrust action.

However, antitrust probably cannot commence until the Bells give their
termination notices to the ISPs.  So it may well be the ISPs' bankruptcy
estates who will fight that battle.

Another approach is to go straight to Federal Court and argue that the FCC
drastically exceeded its Brand X authority in this decision.  Here, I think
Copps got it 100% wrong.  The Majority opinion was quite explicit in *not*
ruling that telephone companies should be exempted from common
carriage.  It concerned the fact that cable could be treated *differently*,
not that the treatment of cable was appropriate for ILECs.  Here's my
analysis of Brand X, and why Martin's reading was so wrong.  This is why I
think a Court could overturn the FCC on this one, if the case is presented
correctly.

As some of you may know, I never supported the Brand X respondents -- I
work with cable guys too, so I'm sensitive to their position.  The ILECs
are abusing cable's position as an excuse to evade their own
responsibilities.  I've long argued (and there's a link on my website to a
copy of my 1999 Multichannel News opinion piece on the subject:
http://www.ionary.com/CableAccess.htm ) that cable companies should
voluntarily open up to all ISPs, for their own sake.  But it doesn't make
them common carriers, any more than a WISP with its own Part 15 antennas
has to open its radios to other ISPs.  The letter of the law, which could
perhaps be called a gift to the cable industry from Congress, is with the
cable guys.

The Supremes upheld that view, overturning the Ninth Circuit, on what look
like basically ordinary points of law.  They affirmed that Chevron applied,
and it trumped stare decisis from the Portland case.  To me this was a
no-brainer, because Portland was an outlier.  Chevron gives the FCC a lot
of latitude. Under Chevron, the FCC need merely have a plausible
interpretation of an ambiguous law, and courts don't have the right to step
in with a better interpretation, even if there obviously is one.  The
Telecom Act was intentionally ambiguous, and its authors lacked a
consistent theory, so the FCC has plenty of room.  But not infinite room.

Even given that, the dissent was interesting.  Scalia's view, joined by
Souter and Ginsburg, was that the FCC's reading of the law was beyond
reasonable.  "After all is said and done, after all the regulatory cant has
been translated, and the smoke of agency expertise blown away, it remains
perfectly clear that someone who sells cable-modem service is "offering"
telecommunications." So even if they agreed on the Chevron rule's trumping
stare decisis, they didn't think Chevron applied here.  To me that's a
warning; if three justices think that the FCC went that far in what seemed
to me to be a fairly easy interpretation, then the FCC's Chevron latitude
isn't necessarily huge.  That's good.

At 26, the Court said, "As we understand the Declaratory Ruling, the
Commission did not say that any telecommunications service that is priced
or bundled with an information service is automatically unregulated under
Title II. The Commission said that a telecommunications input used to
provide an information service that is not "separable from the
data-processing capabilities of the service" and is instead "part and
parcel of [the information service] and is integral to [the information
service's] other capabilities" is not a telecommunications offering.
Declaratory Ruling 4823, ¶39; see supra, at 16­17."

That's the heart of the argument, from the cable point of view.  But from a
DSL point of view, where the services are obviously "separable", it doesn't
seem to apply.  MCI btw did not seem to help the ISP's cause with their
arguments, which the Majority said would have led to Title II regulation of
all ISPs, even those who lease facilities.  I sense some bad lawyering
there, but then I didn't actually hear their arguments.  The Court may have
just mis-taken them.  But in its action today, the Commission actually does
start talking about regulating ISPs, albeit under Title I, both for
content, and (presumably to get rural-advocate Adelstein's concurrence)
price.  While there is no price regulation per se, broadband ISPs will
apparently now be subject to rate-averaging rules, like long distance
companies, so rural subscribers cannot be charged more than urban
ones.  (This is certainly not a hallmark of a fully competitive
marketplace.)

The issue at hand is forbearance and the removal of both Title II Common
Carriage and the Computer Inquiries from ILEC DSL services.  Martin's
recent talk of equalizing treatment on a deregulated basis does not
comport, as I read it, with these parts of the Supreme Court's Brand X
ruling:

[still at 26]
"This construction does not leave all information service offerings exempt
from mandatory Title II regulation. "It is plain," for example, that a
local telephone company "cannot escape Title II regulation of its
residential local exchange service simply by packaging that service with
voice mail." Universal Service Report 11530, ¶60. That is because a
telephone company that packages voice mail with telephone service offers a
transparent transmission path— telephone service—that transmits information
independent of the information-storage capabilities provided by voice
mail.... By contrast, the high-speed transmission used to provide cable
modem service is a functionally integrated component of that service
because it transmits data only in connection with the further processing of
information and is necessary to provide Internet service. The Commission's
construction therefore was more limited than respondents assume."

Now, the "Commission's construction" has been changed to mean almost the
opposite of what it was when the Supreme Court ruled.  DSL is not a
"functionally integrated component" in the same sense.

As a technical expert, I am fully prepared to explain why the underlying
DSL service is "transparent" and "transmits information independent
of the information-storage capabilities" or its equivalent.  DSL is simply
a physical medium upon which ATM (or occasionally Frame Relay) is layered.
Those are transparent bearer services, long tariffed.  And the history of
independent ISPs using it is proof.  No such history existed for cable
modems. I've heard anecdotally that some of the design input into the
DOCSIS spec was intended to make sharing of the plant by ISPs
difficult.  (@Home was in business at the time, and they may have had a
finger in the pie, even if indirectly through their owners.)  So the two
worlds are Different, with a capital D:

[at 29]
"...MCI claims that the Commission's decision not to regulate cable
companies similarly under Title II is inconsistent with its DSL policy.

"We conclude, however, that the Commission provided a reasoned explanation
for treating cable modem service differently from DSL service. As we have
already noted, see supra, at 9­10, the Commission is free within the limits
of reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the
change.4 It has done so here. The traditional reason for its Computer II
common-carrier treatment of facilities-based carriers (including DSL
carriers), as the Commission explained, was "that the telephone network
[was] the primary, if not exclusive, means through which information
service providers can gain access to their customers." Declaratory Ruling
4825, ¶44 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). The
Commission applied the same treatment to DSL service based on that history,
rather than on an analysis of contemporaneous market conditions. See
Wireline Order 24031, ¶37 (noting DSL carriers' "continuing obligation" to
offer their transmission facilities to competing ISPs on nondiscriminatory
terms)."

So the Court is agreeing that DSL and Cable are Different, not that
"broadband", whatever it is, never has a telecommunications service
component. And the Court recognizes the special role played by common
carriers on behalf of ISPs -- exactly the role that the FCC today abolished.

Next, the Court gave what seems to be Martin's little opening:

"The Commission in the order under review, by contrast, concluded that
changed market conditions warrant different treatment of facilities-based
cable companies providing Internet access. Unlike at the time of Computer
II, substitute forms of Internet transmission exist today: "[R]esidential
high-speed access to the Internet is evolving over multiple electronic
platforms, including wireline, cable, terrestrial wireless and satellite."
Declaratory Ruling 4802, ¶6; see also U. S. Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 290 F. 3d
415, 428 (CADC 2002) (noting Commission findings of "robust competition . .
. in the broadband market"). The Commission concluded that " 'broadband
services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes
investment and innovation in a competitive market.' " Declaratory Ruling
4802, ¶5. This, the Commission reasoned, warranted treating cable companies
unlike the facilities-based enhanced-service providers of the past. Id.Id.,
at 4825, ¶44. We find nothing arbitrary about the Commission's providing a
fresh analysis of the problem as applied to the cable industry, which it
has never subjected to these rules. This is adequate rational justification
for the Commission's conclusions. "

So here they're accepting the FCC's speculative assumption of intermodal
competition as a plausible reason for adopting a policy.  But even then,
they cap it off by saying "as applied to the cable industry, which it has
never subjected to these rules".  Plausibility within Chevron guidelines
may apply here to cable, but since there's a qualitative and quantitative
difference between the long-time "carrier of last resort" (ILEC) and a new
entrant (cable), it is a stretch to say that this paragraph absolutely
blesses Martin's view.

This seems reinforced by a concluding paragraph:
[at 31]
"Respondents argue, in effect, that the Commission's justification for
exempting cable modem service providers from common-carrier regulation
applies with similar force to DSL providers. We need not address that
argument."

So why did Copps think they did?  I doubt he actually read the whole
Decision. Indeed, the "Respondent" MCI seemed to be taking Verizon's
position here, not the one Brand X would like.  The Court did not go
there.  Continuing within that paragraph,

"The Commission's decision appears to be a first step in an effort to
reshape the way the Commission regulates information- service providers;
that may be why it has tentatively concluded that DSL service provided by
facilities-based telephone companies should also be classified solely as an
information service. See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3030, ¶20
(2002). The Commission need not immediately apply the policy reasoning in
the Declaratory Ruling to all types of information service providers. "

So, Copps cop-out notwithstanding,  the Court knows that the FCC wants to
deregulated telcos, and is inviting them to *not* do so...

"It apparently has decided to revisit its longstanding Computer II
classification of facilities-based information-service providers
incrementally. Any inconsistency between the order under review and the
Commission's treatment of DSL service can be adequately addressed when the
Commission fully reconsiders its treatment of DSL service and when it
decides whether, pursuant to its ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to require
cable companies to allow independent ISPs access to their facilities. See
supra, at 7, this page. We express no view on those matters. "

Here, they're equally inviting the FCC to use Title I, as it exists, to
create the open access obligation for cable that Brand X the company had
called for. Such a result is thus explicitly within their Chevron
latitude.  It's the opposite of what they did.  The FCC made "one hand like
the other", but it was the wrong hand.

"In particular, we express no view on how the Commission should, or
lawfully may, classify DSL service."

So Martin claimed DSL was deregulated by Brand X, and got Copps and
Adelstein to believe it too, but that sentence proves otherwise.  The Court
did not rule either way, and seemed to invite the FCC to deliberate slowly
on the whole area, not to rule rashly one way or the other.

So I see plenty of grounds to appeal the FCC's decision to the Federal
judiciary, simply on grounds that they did not properly apply a fairly
clear Supreme Court ruling.  This rash deregulation of DSL would probably
keep the three dissenters together against the FCC, and could very easily
bring in others, should it get that far.



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