On 6/11/2014 8:09 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
On 11/06/14 15:54, Joe Touch wrote:
On 6/7/2014 6:20 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Yes, source addresses leak information that affects privacy. But
we do not have a practical way to mitigate that. So therefore
BCP188 does not call for doing stupid stuff, nor for new laws of
physics (unlike -04 of the draft we're discussing;-)
Again, BCP188 does not *call* for doing anything. There are no SHOULD-
or MUST- level requirements in that doc. Let's please not wave it in the
air as if there are.
I don't buy that argument at all and didn't wave anything anywhere.
BCP188 very clearly says:
Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated
in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.
and
Those developing IETF specifications need to be able to describe how
they have considered PM, and, if the attack is relevant to the work
to be published, be able to justify related design decisions. This
does not mean a new "pervasive monitoring considerations" section is
needed in IETF documentation. It means that, if asked, there needs
to be a good answer to the question "Is pervasive monitoring relevant
to this work and if so, how has it been considered?"
Reverting to RFC2119-keyword-lawyering is not IMO credible here.
That's what RFC2119 is for and how we interpret BCPs.
The doc goes out of its way - as you note - to include wiggle phrases
like "where possible" and by not requiring a new considerations section.
Yes, it's fine to discuss it here, and I've already outlined a way
forward - with the caveat that my view is "do no harm", not necessarily
"fix the lack of privacy already inherent in the Internet" - at least in
this doc.
Joe
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