Kathleen,

AFAIK, most IP stacks include code that detects fragmentation overlap attacks. 
(Do I have that right?)

So, reassembly attacks shouldn't be effective whether reassembly is performed 
at the GRE egress or the ultimate destination.

If reassembly is performed at the ultimate destination, the two endpoints might 
be alerted. However, if reassembly is performed at the GRE ingress, the 
endpoints might never be alerted.

Should we add a paragraph about this in Section 5 (Security Considerations). Or 
is this just another type of DoS attack, which we have already mentioned?

                                                                                
                        Ron


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2015 10:14 PM
> To: The IESG
> Cc: [email protected]; draft-ietf-intarea-gre-
> [email protected]; [email protected]; draft-ietf-intarea-gre-
> [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
> Subject: Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-intarea-gre-mtu-04: (with
> DISCUSS)
> 
> Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-intarea-gre-mtu-04: Discuss
> 
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> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for your work on this draft, I have a question I'd like to discuss to 
> see
> if another security consideration needs to be added.  This should be very
> quick to resolve.
> 
> Do we need to worry about fragmentation overlap attacks when packets are
> reassembled?  I see that you would not have to worry about it in cases
> where fragmentation is handled at a different layer as is the case with some
> of the methods as it might be addressed at that layer.  Or does it not matter
> as the reassembled packets would be forwarded and the device
> reassembling wouldn't be processing the payload where an exploit could
> avoid detection?
> 
> 
> 

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