the x9a10 working committee (part of x9 financial standards body) was given the charter of preserving the integrity of financial infrastructure for all retail transactions (not just internet, not just point-of-sale, etc.).
basically the result is X9.59 which is a light-weight digital signature authentication that can be mapped into international standard financial industry 8583 networks. basically it was done in such a way that it provides for end-to-end digital signature authentication and security ... being able to be mapped directly into the actual international standard 8583 transactions on an end-to-end basis from customer striaght thru to the customer's financial institution. It isn't specific to internet and it isn't specific to credit .... but is appicable to all retail payments (credit, debit, stored, value, atm, etc) in all environments (POS, internet, atm, etc). the advantage is that the actual financial transaction is the thing being authenticated on an end-to-end basis. there isn't a truncated authentication that doesn't make it thru to the customer's (issuing) financial institution. There isn't a separate authentication transaction that is totally different from the actual financial transaction. The actual financial transaction carries the authentication of the financial transaction on an end-to-end basis. There isn't any separate need for a different routing/lookup mechanism for the authentication operation that travels totally different from the actual transaction nominally when talking about end-to-end authentication .... the normal reference is to the actual transaction .... some of these proposals creates a totally different transaction ... that flows via a totally different path ... and while it might get from the client/customer to the customer's (issuing) financial intitution ... it isn't an end-to-end secure financial transaction ...... it is a totally different transaction (and doesn't meet the nominal definition of end-to-end security). random refs: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#x959 also reference to the nacha/debit/atm pilot http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 5/27/2002 at 1:43am wrote: Hi Anders, About the proposition: I think the main problem of 3D Secure is that it's only an authentication mechanism and not a payment protocol at all. Compared to SET, the seperation auf authentication mechanism and payment protocol is a huge step back. About core technology: it's interresting that in Jannuary, we had a similar idea. However, we didn't think that the customer wants to remember the issuer's domain, so we proposed a lookup mechanism (similar to DNS) mapping the user's eMail adress to the domain of his/her issuing bank. About the idea: Great approach! Yours, Sebastian Kübeck ____________________________________________________ QENTA paymentsolutions sebastian kübeck www.qenta.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] tel: +43 316 81 36 81-0 fax: +43 316 81 36 81-20
