http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=24423

What is next for Saudi Arabia? 

08/03/2011
By John Sfakianakis


Markets are beginning to price a shift of contagion from North Africa to some 
of the Gulf economies, principally Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The possibility of 
contagion spreading to Saudi Arabia remains low although markets are pricing a 
higher risk premium. Bahrain's future is a leading indicator but there is not 
enough clarity about short-term political outcomes. 

If we learned anything during the most recent financial crisis it is that 
markets can get it wrong. During the recent Egyptian crisis, oil prices spiked 
over concerns about the transshipment of oil via the Suez Canal. Markets today 
are beginning to price contagion effects spreading from North Africa to, 
principally, Bahrain. Although it is hard to predict the political outcome in 
the Gulf island, markets are pricing a premium on the risk of contagion to 
neighboring Saudi Arabia. Aside from making any definite calls on the future 
outcome of Bahrain, we remain reassuring about Saudi Arabia. The chances of 
disruption to oil production remain distant as is the likelihood of major 
unrest. Markets have a tendency to differentiate less during crises and, as we 
saw during the Dubai debt crisis in 2009, risk premiums spiked for all. 
Differentiation took time, however.

Saudi Arabia's ability to carry out distributive policies is obvious, 
particularly in areas that have important social significance. The government 
announced an estimated USD36bn spending programme (as much as 8.3% of last 
year's GDP) on housing, education and social welfare on top of a 2011 budget 
which is the largest in its history. Saudi King Abdullah recently unveiled a 
string of financial support measures geared towards citizens through new 
unemployment benefits that stand to help youths facing double-digit joblessness 
rates; expansion of social security safety nets set to target lower-income 
Saudis; and substantial funds allocated to writing off the debts of deceased 
borrowers and prisoners. The royal order, which includes 19 components, strives 
to promote job creation, expedite the supply of housing, and improve funding 
for education, charity associations, cultural and sporting clubs, and 
professional associations.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has the capacity to underwrite similar distributive 
policies, without resorting to domestic or external financing. Central bank 
foreign assets (SAMA) were at USD444.8bn as at December 2010 (102% of 2010 
GDP), which provides ample fiscal buffers. The package announced at end-Feb 
will be financed from these reserves. Hence Saudi Arabia is forecast to witness 
twin surpluses (fiscal and current account) as oil prices continue their 
buoyant performance. Hence, the state has the capacity to tap into its huge 
deep pockets to support any short- to medium-term emergency spending 
programmes. We believe that the chance of major unrest within Saudi Arabia is 
not probable. The economic changes desired and needed are not predicated on 
calls for a change in the leadership structure. A cabinet reshuffle is a 
welcome step towards political refreshment. However, the leadership cannot 
afford complacency and neglect as events in the wider Middle East necessitate 
change. Events in Bahrain should be closely watched as they could act as a 
regional 'self-reflection exercise' for the political landscape.

There is no doubt that uncertainty about the wider Middle East will continue to 
impact Saudi Arabia's CDS or could at some point impact SAR forward rates, 
should uncertainty escalate further. The strength of events in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Bahrain, Libya as well as Yemen has led most to expect the worst to come for 
the rest. Differentiation and re-classification of risk is warranted, but it 
takes time for the dust to settle. Regional stock markets will continue to 
reflect the higher perceived risks.

We think that markets will continue to price additional risk premiums despite 
the arguments put forward about Saudi Arabia's fiscal and political capacity to 
weather the regional crisis. The CDS spreads have widened recently. However, 
they remain far below the level they reached during the Ma'an - Qussaibi 
defaults. Spread could remain large or widen further in the short term.

Saudi Arabia's systemic role in the global oil market is paramount for the 
world economy. The kingdom's extra capacity is 4mbpd, which can be put on to 
the market in a short period of time and is more than twice the total current 
production of Libya. We think that Saudi Arabia's oil facilities remain under 
no threat and the country's oil production will remain uninterrupted. However, 
the market may think otherwise at some point, should tensions rise further in 
the Gulf. 

The role of the US in the Gulf is expected to be more vigilantly active. In the 
case of Tunisia and Libya, the US's role has remained subdued due to its modest 
historical and diplomatic ties. However, the role the US would take in the 
event of Bahrain's political landscape being radically reshaped, as it is the 
base for the fifth fleet, remains to be tested. There is little evidence to 
lead us to anticipate Saudi Arabia being the next country to face domestic 
unrest, turmoil, violence and calls for regime change. We do believe that Saudi 
Arabia will embark on various economic and reforms that have a wider inclusive 
and distributive purpose. However, the end-game for the rest of the Middle East 
is far from clear at this point.


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