http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MC11Ak02.html
Mar 11, 2011
Generational rage in the House of Saud
By Brian M Downing
World attention is rightly fixed on the fighting in Libya, but events in Saudi
Arabia slated for Friday, March 11, might well take precedent. Young Saudis are
mobilizing for "day of rage" demonstrations calling for political reforms but
the regime has warned against any such gatherings. A confrontation with immense
geopolitical and economic import is nearing. Capitals and bourses are watching
anxiously. The outcome is of course unclear, but a look at the dramatis
personae and possible developments might be attempted.
Generational conflict
Demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere have pitted educated
young people eager for a say in their futures against aging if not decrepit
regimes that denied them that say. It will be no different in Saudi Arabia
where over half the population is under the age of 30. But the generational
conflict will resonate with politics and intrigues within the large Saud
family.
The Saudi government is directed by the descendants of Abdul Aziz bin Saud, the
great warrior-king who conquered much of the Arabian Peninsula following the
demise of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Since his death in 1953, his
kingdom has been ruled by a line of sons, as practice calls for the crown to
pass down to younger sons.
Only on the last son's death - there are still over 10 of them - is it to pass
on to the next generation, though a council formed in 2006 will shape future
successions. King Abdullah is 87, Crown Prince Sultan is perhaps four years
younger - a situation reminiscent of the Soviet politburo a generation ago.
Discontent abounds within the ranks of the old warrior-king's grandchildren,
many of whom bristle at being passed over for key positions in favor of their
better connected but less capable cousins. Accordingly, public calls for change
from Saudi youths will likely resonate with resentments within the younger
princes - perhaps also within the princesses.
One of the younger men, Prince Bandar (the Crown Prince's son and former
ambassador to the United States), dropped from sight a year ago - the result of
a failed palace intrigue according to some reports. Whatever response to the
demonstrations is being planned, the elders will have to bear in mind the
thinking of their offspring and also the power their offspring hold thanks to
the positions they have been granted in the state and in the military as well.
Advisory councils
In the 1990s, the government constructed consultative bodies (Majlis-ash-Shura)
in order to fend off pressures that emerged during the first Gulf War in 1991
from both modern reformers and Wahhabist traditionalists. These councils are
non-elective; members are appointed by the king. Nor do they have legislative
powers; they are consultative only. The councils nonetheless express the views
of tribal elders, professional associations, and client-patron networks.
Historically, timid councils have sometimes tossed aside the subordinate role
their creators envisioned and turned themselves into ambitious assemblies.
Edward I convened the Model Parliament to do his bidding; they became a
powerful and enduring institution. Louis XVI likely regretted convening an
Estates-General as he climbed the scaffold. The Soviet duma helped thwart a
military coup and bring down communism.
Amid these extraordinary times, Saudi council members may well take sides with
reformers, either out of practical or ideological concerns - perhaps to the
extent of demanding legislative powers and turning the country into a
constitutional monarchy. History seems to be on their side.
Sunni and Shi'ite
Unlike events in Tunisia and Egypt, though as with events in Bahrain, the calls
for change in Saudi Arabia have a Shi'ite versus Sunni dimension and so the
centuries-old schism will shape the movement and perhaps distort the regime's
perceptions of it. Saudi Arabia's 28 million people are approximately 10-15%
Shi'ite. They complain of systematic prejudice against their faith and of
discrimination in jobs and governmental favors. They are primarily found in the
oil-producing Eastern province.
As problematic as sectarianism is, it is worsened if not poisoned by
geopolitics. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long vied for primacy in the Persian
Gulf. The contest was reasonably non-threatening under the shah but became
volatile once he was ousted and a Shi'ite theocracy came to power.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for Shi'ite uprisings but found very little
response, though in 1979 Saudi suppression of Ashura mourning rites led to
bloody riots in a few eastern towns. The Saudis supported Saddam Hussein's 1980
invasion of Iran and Saudi jets dueled with Iranian ones on more than one
occasion. The Saudis play a key role in assembling a Sunni-Arab coalition aimed
at countering Iran and pressing it to drop its nuclear weapons program.
Saudi leaders today almost certainly see events in Bahrain and impending ones
in their own realm to be the work of Iran, especially its Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC). Shi'ites do not need a foreign agent to apprise them of
their plight or inspire hope of a better day, but the perception of the IRGC's
hand will be a critical part of shaping the Saudi response and may cause some
of Abdullah's advisers to recommend a firm response.
Options for repression
Three armed forces are available to the king. The national army is commanded by
senior princes but has a large number of conscripts, whose willingness to come
down hard on their countrymen is uncertain - uncertain both to foreign
observers and to royal advisers as well. Friday would be an inopportune time to
receive bad news on this regard so caution may be in order.
The national guard comprises a number of tribal levies. This is in some
respects the institutional legacy of Abdul Aziz's tribal bands that conquered
the land ninety years ago. The national guard is generally considered to be
mainly a counterforce against any intrigue coming from the regular army. There
are a few tribes who are hostile to the Saudi regime, but of course those
forces are unlikely to be deployed.
Neither the army nor the national guard is built chiefly for internal security
purposes; neither brought accolades during the first Gulf War or the uprising
in Mecca in 1979.
The Interior Ministry maintains security troops. It is a professional force
that performed remarkably well in quashing al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula over the
past 10 years. Initial responses to terrorism were heavy-handed and
counterproductive. The public resented the harsh methods and al-Qaeda throve on
public resentments.
When less harsh methods were adopted in 1999, public support plummeted and
al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula was effectively driven out of the realm and into the
wastelands of Yemen. It might be significant that the shift away from harsh
methods was done on the orders of Abdullah, the present-day king. He is ailing
but perhaps still aware of the counterproductive nature of his predecessor's
brutal methods.
Abdullah's defeat of domestic terrorism may be instructive in another regard.
Al-Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula made the blunder of calling for insurrection against
the House of Saud, which, at least back in 1999, was not widely loathed. That
is likely still the case with most of the people as the government has been
generous though not necessarily equitable with the petro-wealth.
An ill-advised crackdown, however, could easily and irreparably change that and
make the transition to constitutional monarchy longer and more painful than it
needs to be.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and the author of The Military
Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change
in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
[email protected]
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