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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110314-saudi-intervention-bahrain?utm_source=redalert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110314&utm_content=readmore&elq=1075237d48f54778ba68873c16e236bd


Saudi Intervention in Bahrain
March 14, 2011 | 1051 GMT


Reports emerged on March 14 that forces from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries will enter Bahrain to help the Bahraini regime quell unrest. The 
report was published by Bahraini Alyam Newspaper (known for its close links 
with the ruling al-Khalifa family), and came one day after clashes occurred 
between Shiite protesters and police in the capital, Manama. Troops from United 
Arab Emirates are reportedly expected to arrive in Bahrain March 14. Al Arabiya 
reported that Saudi forces have already entered Bahrain, but these claims have 
yet to be officially confirmed by the Bahraini regime. The only announcement so 
far came from Nabil al-Hamar, the former information minister and adviser to 
the royal family, who has written on Twitter that the Arab forces arrived in 
Bahrain. An unnamed Saudi official also said on March 14 that more than 1,000 
Saudi troops from the Shield of Island entered Bahrain on late March 13, 
al-Quds reported, citing AFP. Meanwhile, Bahraini State News Agency reported 
that The Independent Bloc (a parliamentary bloc of the Bahraini parliament) 
asked Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to enforce martial law to contain 
the unrest.

These reports suggest foreign intervention in Bahrain, or at least the 
possibility that the Bahraini military is taking over the security reins. Such 
moves mean the regime is getting increasingly concerned with Shiite unrest, 
which does not seem to be subsiding despite dialogue calls from Bahraini Crown 
Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa. The ongoing unrest is exacerbated by 
the split between Bahrain's Shiite movement, which became clearer during 
protests on March 11. The more hard-line faction of the Shiite movement, led by 
the Wafa and al-Haq blocs, has been increasing the tension on the streets in 
the hopes of stalling the talks between the Shiite Al Wefaq-led coalition's 
negotiations with the regime. Military intervention from GCC countries means 
the situation is increasingly untenable for the regime. The paradox the 
Bahraini regime faces is that it cannot contain the unrest while trying to kick 
off talks with Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq finds itself in a difficult position, since 
it risks losing ground against hardliners if it appears too close to the regime 
while Shiite protesters are beaten by the police.

The Bahraini regime has used a military option before. On Feb 17, the military 
deployed immediately after a police crackdown in Manama's Pearl Roundabout and 
was able to calm down the situation for a while by encircling the area with 
tanks. If Bahrain indeed has called Saudi intervention this time, the 
implication is that the Bahraini military is not confident in its ability to 
contain the unrest now. Riyadh's decision to send forces to Manama could be 
taken to this end, since wider spread of Shiite unrest from Bahrain to Saudi 
Arabia would aggravate the already existing protests among Saudi Arabia's own 
Shiite population. Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is not unprecedented. 
Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in 1994 when Riyadh determined that Shiite 
unrest threatened the al-Khalifa regime.

Regional implications of the unrest in Bahrain became more obvious when U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Manama on March 12 and urged the 
Bahraini regime to implement bold reforms. Gates said Iranian interference 
would become a greater possibility if Bahrain fails to do so. While Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia seem to be coordinating to avoid that possibility, it is not 
without risks. Leader of the hard-line Haq movement Hassan Mushaima, who is 
believed to be increasing the Shiite unrest in Bahrain by Iranian support, said 
on Feb. 28 that Saudi intervention in Bahrain would give Iran the same right to 
intervene as well. A scenario of regional Sunni Arab forces cracking down on 
Shia would apply pressure on Iran to respond more overtly, but its military 
ability is limited and it is a very risky option given the U.S. 5th fleet is 
stationed in Bahrain. As of this writing, there is no sign that Iranian 
military is taking steps toward that end, however, the situation on the ground 
could escalate if Shia in Bahrain ramp up demonstrations.


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