http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1085/focus.htm
16 - 22 February 2011
Issue No. 1085
Focus
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
Islamism at the crossroads
Following the recent victories of the Islamists at the polls, which form of
political Islam will Egypt choose, asks Gihan Shahine
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Click to view caption
A file photo dated 6 May 2011, Egyptian protesters chant anti-American
slogans and hold copies of the Quran, and a picture of Al-Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden, during a protest held by Islamist groups against the killing of Bin
Laden, in front of the US embassy in Cairo
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Now that the grip of the Islamists over the new Egyptian parliament has been
decided, many people are becoming increasingly concerned over the policies the
next government may introduce, perhaps setting the country on a conservative
course.
A perhaps unprecedented fear of the Islamists is now beginning to emerge in
Egypt, some fearing that an ultra-conservative form of Islam will now prevail,
competing with what is now being ironically seen as the more moderate discourse
of the Muslim Brotherhood, previously the bogeyman for many.
Egypt's first democratic polls in the post-revolutionary period indicated that
a majority of Egyptians may want an Islamist government. Egypt's largest and
best-organised Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice
Party, now constitutes the largest bloc in parliament, followed by the
ultra-conservative Salafist Nour Party which unexpectedly is the second-largest
political group in the parliament. There is also the moderate Islamist Wasat
Party, formed of Brotherhood dissidents, which came fourth on the list of
parties winning seats in the new parliament.
This strong showing on the part of the Islamists has concerned liberal and
secularist groups, who worry that the new parliament, tasked with selecting a
100-member panel to draft the new constitution and arguably name the new
government, will now push for an Islamist agenda. Egypt's Copts are also
worried, while some of the young activists who spearheaded the 25 January
Revolution that toppled the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak feel that
their revolution has been hijacked.
Yet, political Islam takes many different forms, ranging from the liberal model
found in Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey, to the more conservative patterns of
Saudi Arabia and Iran and the fundamentalist doctrine in place in Afghanistan.
Which form of political Islam the Arab Spring will usher in in the Arab world
in general, and in Egypt in particular, remains an open question, though it is
one worrying many inside and outside Egypt, especially in the United States and
Israel.
On the domestic level, Egypt's liberal and secular groups have become fixed in
a state of mourning at the Islamists' landslide victory at the ballot boxes. "A
funeral" is how prominent political analyst and expert on Islamic affairs Fahmy
Howeidy describes Egypt's political scene following the polls. "This state of
'grieving' on the part of secularists is similar to that of Israeli
policy-makers," Howeidy wrote in his column in the independent daily Al-Shorouq.
However, while Howeidy wrote that he found it understandable that Israel should
worry about the rise of political Islam, he could not understand why Egypt's
liberals and secularists should be concerned.
The Islamists have been portrayed in the media as "coming to power over the
bodies of the Tahrir martyrs," or chosen by "Egypt's 40 per cent of ignorant,
impoverished and frustrated people" who are now "hijacking" the revolution. One
liberal activist was quoted in the daily independent Al-Youm Al-Sabei recently
as having vowed to "confront the Islamists' grip on the country, even if this
means engaging in conflict with them."
Many observers are critical of this scenario of secularists versus Islamists in
post-revolutionary Egypt, seeing it as having diverted the attention of the
elite from attending to the more urgent demands of the revolution. Without
improvements to the economy and the attainment of social justice, many
speculate that the country will face a second wave of protests, this time by
impoverished and hungry people.
The Islamists for their part insist that the current "Islamophobia" has been
one reason behind the rise of a second wave of protests. Assem Abdel-Maged,
spokesman for the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya group, is among those who accuse young
secular activists belonging to the 6 April movement of "provoking constant
turmoil" in order to impede the victory of the Islamists in parliament and to
stop them from making any progress in their legislative programme.
However, secularist writer Salah Eissa contends that the secularists' fight for
a civil state and against the Islamists is justified. "It is clear from the
latest polls that the Islamists have strong popularity," Eissa said, but "the
real problem with the groups representing political Islam in Egypt, including
the Brotherhood and the Salafis, is that they are not open to ijtihad,"
referring to what he sees as their refusal to be open to new interpretations of
Islam.
Eissa said that "the power of the Brotherhood relies more on public
mobilisation and less on its having a programme adapted to the needs of the
third millennium." Although the group has declared itself as representing a
moderate voice of Islam, Eissa contends that its renunciation of violence has
been the only advance that the group has made. "The Brotherhood still holds
alarmingly conservative views regarding women and Copts," for example, Eissa
explained. "They still insist, for instance, that women and Copts should not be
allowed to compete for the presidency or be judges."
For their part, members of the Brotherhood insist that theirs is a moderate
group that wants to implement Islamic Sharia law without sacrificing personal
freedoms. They are widely viewed as representing moderate views of Islam,
especially when compared to the ultra-conservative Salafi groups.
The group has also revisited many of its former positions, including those
concerning women and religious minorities. Women constitute more than 10 per
cent of the founders of the Brotherhood's new political party, the Freedom and
Justice Party, while the vice chair of the party is the prominent Coptic
intellectual Rafiq Habib.
A recent editorial in the British newspaper The Guardian entitled "Islam in
Egypt: fear and fantasy" suggested that people should be more anxious about the
future of Egypt than fearful of the Muslim Brotherhood. The editorial argued
that the Brotherhood should not provoke the public's fear, since it is "now
less a radical organisation than a conservative one, striving to be relevant to
modern needs, and divided on how far it can or should trim its policies."
Chair of the Freedom and Justice Party Mohamed Mursi was quoted in the
editorial as saying that "the country's new constitution would guarantee equal
rights to all Egyptians regardless of religion, gender, race or colour," and
these comments also appear on the party's Twitter page.
Mohamed Sudan, foreign relations secretary for the Freedom and Justice Party in
Alexandria, was also quoted as insisting that the Brotherhood was known as "the
most moderate political group in the Islamic world". The group would "guarantee
everyone his or her citizenship rights, regardless of faith" and would "not
interfere in the relationship between the citizen and his God," according to
the Associated Press.
As a result, the Salafis are widely viewed as being perhaps a stronger threat
to individual freedoms in Egypt. The Salafis, who dominate the Nour Party, are
newcomers to the political scene, and they previously avoided direct
involvement in politics mainly because they were often persecuted or jailed by
the former regime. The Salafis are known to adopt a strict interpretation of
Islam similar to that in Saudi Arabia, which promotes the segregation of the
sexes and women's wearing of the Islamic veil.
Since they are new to politics, some Salafis have been trapped by the media and
quoted, or even misquoted, expressing extreme opinions that may pose a threat
to personal freedoms. The media has had a field day reporting the words of some
Salafis to the effect that they want to impose an agenda on Egypt that would
impose the Islamic veil on women, prevent women's employment, mixed workplaces
and beaches, and ban alcohol in public areas.
However, a spokesman for the Nour Party told the news agency AFP that the group
had been the target of a "campaign of fear-mongering and slander over the past
10 months," insisting that "neither the country's large Christian community nor
liberal Muslims had anything to fear from his group, which he said would focus
on improving all Egyptians' lives."
The spokesman also tried to appease fears that the Salafis might try to ban
alcohol by arguing that this was a marginal issue concerning only perhaps
20,000 people out of Egypt's total population of 80 million that do not drink
alcohol. Meanwhile, nearly half the population, something like 40 million
people, do not have safe water to drink, he said. "Do you think that in
parliament I'll busy myself with people who don't have water, or people who get
drunk," the spokesman asked.
Yet, despite these reassurances Eissa contends that it remains worrying that
some members of the Salafi groups have said that they are seeking the
establishment of an "Islamic state" in Egypt, and that laws that in their view
contradict Islamic Sharia law cannot be passed.
Many observers now say that the identity of post-revolutionary Egypt will
depend on whether the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party will move to the
right and ally itself with the Salafis, or whether it will aim for a centrist
coalition that includes secularist parties. So far, the Brotherhood has seemed
to be seeking to form a centrist alliance, but many still fear that this may
change over time.
"Many secularists fear that the Islamists are only appeasing public fears and
adapting their agenda to suit public demands until they tighten their grip on
the country," said Hani Raslan, an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political
and Strategic Studies. "Once in power, they may start pushing their
ultra-conservative agenda."
Raslan, however, is not unduly concerned. "The masses that flocked to Tahrir
Square to commemorate the 25 January Revolution were sending a message to the
parliament to the effect that no single party can rule the country according to
its own doctrine alone," Raslan said. The real intentions of the Brothers will
be made clear in a few weeks' time when the drafting of the new constitution
begins. Thus far, the group has said that it wants this to represent all
political trends. The Islamists will be shooting themselves in the foot if they
attempt to impose their views, or if they do not respect the moderate Islamic
identity of the already religious population, he said.
"They will be rejected by the public if they try to do this," Raslan insisted.
Though Eissa suspects that the Brotherhood's "seemingly moderate statements may
be part of a PR campaign to counter secularist attacks," he also speculates
that "the group will have to adapt its agenda to meet demands for a civil
state."
"This is my personal bet," Eissa told Al-Ahram Weekly. "History has shown that
all ideologies ultimately have to adapt to reality."
Other observers agree that the Salafis' "political immaturity" is bound to
change over time, with Raslan for one contending that experience in parliament
will oblige them to modify their views to a more down-to-earth agenda. "The
Salafis will change their superficial outlook, which puts the emphasis on
appearances and religious rituals, to a more sophisticated approach that
attends to more urgent needs related to poverty, illiteracy, poor education,
housing and health services," he said.
Many would agree with Raslan that the Salafis' recent engagement in dialogue
with Israeli policy-makers and the US ambassador, together with their attempts
to quell fears regarding Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, already show a step
in this direction.
The models of Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey already show that a combination of
liberalism and moderate Islamism is possible, but the question remains whether
such models can be introduced in Egypt. The rise of the Islamists in Tunisia
and Morocco has also not stirred up as much controversy, fear and antagonism as
it has in Egypt.
Howeidy said that one main difference between Egypt and Tunisia lies in the
fact that political Islam in Tunisia is represented by only one dominant group,
the Nahda Party, which scored more than 40 per cent of the parliamentary seats
with allied parties in last year's Tunisian elections. The Nahda Party,
commented Hani Nasira, a writer and expert on Islamist ideological movements,
also "did not witness the same internal and structural divisions [as those in
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood], and it was perhaps more pronounced in its
criticism of the military and interim government" in Tunisia.
In his article "A comparative look at the Islamists of the Egyptian and
Tunisian revolutions", Nasira argues that Tunisia's Islamists have also been
"more open to reform and compromise than has the Muslim Brotherhood [in Egypt],
as seen in their acceptance of the Tunisian Republican Covenant." According to
Nasira, the later agreement includes "the basic principles of the expected
Tunisian constitution, as well as an acceptance of the electoral act, which
provides for the equal representation of men and women."
Members of the Tunisian Nahda Party are also perhaps more experienced and
eloquent than are members of Egypt's Brotherhood, possibly because they have
been more open to foreign cultures. "Many of the movement's members were
educated in France, and that has definitely reflected on the ability of the
group to approach their own secular society with an enlightened discourse,"
said Amr Hashim Rabie, an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and
Strategic Studies.
This has not been the case in Egypt, where political Islam takes different
forms and where many fear that the rise of the Salafis and the emergence of the
more radical Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya may push the movement as a whole to the
right. "Although the Brotherhood remains the largest Islamist group in Egypt,
it is apparent that their moderate discourse may not be the loudest voice, now
that the Salafi groups have proved that they have a major influence on
society," Howeidy said.
The Salafis are themselves divided into five political groups, sometimes having
different intellectual and political tendencies, and there are at least seven
political parties and groups representing political Islam on the scene overall.
Many members of these groups are new to politics and thus can seem rather
amateurish in their discourse. Now that they are suddenly in the spotlight,
Howeidy said, "many seem lacking in eloquence and know-how, and certainly in
being able to approach society with a moderate discourse that does not create
conflict."
Whereas Tunisia's Islamists have worked on quelling public fears by adopting a
discourse that focuses on important economic and developmental issues and
guarantees respect for personal freedoms, Egypt's Salafis have been focussing
on issues related to women's dress and public conduct, with little attention
given to personal freedoms, Howeidy continued.
There have also been differences in approach to foreign relations, notably
during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Egypt and
Tunisia last September. "The Brotherhood rejected Erdogan's statement of faith
in the role of secularism in constructing nation states," Nasira wrote in his
article. "But Tunisia's Nahda accepted his statement, and even confirmed their
acceptance of it after the 23 October elections in the country." For Nasira,
the difference can be explained by the fact that Egypt's Salafis constitute a
greater challenge to the Brotherhood than do Tunisian Salafis to the Nahda.
Raslan insists that the Turkish model of political Islam cannot be viable in
Egypt either. "The Islamist movement in Turkey was born in a secular
environment where both the law and the constitution are secular," he explained.
"The Islamists thus had to adopt a liberal discourse that would not create
conflicts within the society and in order to maintain their very existence."
There is a consensus among analysts that the ruling Islamist party in Turkey is
restrained by the country's secular army and legal system, a pair of strong
institutional checks that countries such as Egypt lack. Egypt's Islamists would
"reject the Turkish model of Islam as being closer to secularism than it is
Islam," Raslan added.
Yet, if Egypt is not to adopt the Tunisian or Turkish model, observers do not
believe that it will lean towards the stricter Islamist model found in Saudi
Arabia either. "Egypt has a great civilisation, culture and identity that do
not need to adopt the model of any other country," Raslan said, Rabie adding
that "Egyptians have always been religious in a moderate way, and they have
kept their own identity over the centuries. Nothing can change this."
In fact, both Raslan and Rabie reject the very concept of "Islamisation".
Raslan said that in his view those who voted for the Islamists in the recent
parliamentary elections in Egypt were not seeking Islamist rule. Rather, he
said, "they cast their ballots for the Islamists because they believed that
they had integrity and that they were people with clean hands who would not
steal from the country like the former regime did."
Many observers say that the revolutionary masses of the Arab Spring are now
choosing Islamism at the polls because it represents a new and untried
alternative to secular, leftist and liberal ideologies that in the past have
led to authoritarian regimes that failed to meet the people's aspirations. And,
politics aside, many of them insist like Raslan that "the Egyptians will remain
religious in the same way as they always have been, be they Muslims or Copts,
and they will not accept any radical alternative to their identity."
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