http://dawn.com/2012/10/15/revisiting-the-cuban-missile-crisis/

Revisiting the Cuban missile crisis
>From the Newspaper | Richard Gott | 22 hours ago 



HALF a century ago, in October 1962, the world woke up to the Cuban missile 
crisis. The Russians were unloading nuclear missiles on Cuba, and the Americans 
were demanding they be withdrawn. For some people, perhaps for many, it seemed 
the moment to drag out the old evangelical poster: The End of the World is 
Nigh. It was a frightening time. Even today I can remember the chill in the air.

We thought the Americans were going to invade Cuba, a repeat of their efforts 
the previous year at the Bay of Pigs. We knew they had plans to sabotage Fidel 
Castro’s revolution.

Years later, having read almost everything available about the crisis, I 
suspect that it was not quite as serious as it seemed at the time. The cold 
warriors liked to play it up, and so too did British philosopher Bertrand 
Russell and other spokesmen for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Yet it is 
clear from the record that those in charge behaved in an exemplary manner. 
President Kennedy in particular outfaced those of his advisers — like the 
long-lived General Curtis LeMay — who wanted immediate military action. The 
president never allowed the affair to escape from his capable hands.

The Cubans suffered the most. They were happy to host the Soviet missiles, but 
were alarmed by Khrushchev’s insistence that they should be installed secretly. 
Indeed, they argued consistently with the Soviets that these new defence 
arrangements should be made public from the start.

Khrushchev thought differently. He wanted to surprise the Americans. He thought 
that once the missiles were installed the Americans would be confronted with a 
fait accompli. He imagined he was saving Cuba from attack, which was, after 
all, the logic of the nuclear deterrent. He also dispatched a vast conventional 
arsenal, creating the largest foreign military base ever seen in the history of 
the Caribbean.

Inevitably Khrushchev’s deception was eventually uncovered. On Oct 14 a US spy 
plane detected a missile-launching site west of Havana, and a week of serious 
secret discussions began in the White House, followed by a television 
announcement by the US president on the night of Oct 22 that launched the 
public phase of the weeklong crisis.

The presence of the missiles put the Cubans in great danger, and when the 
missiles were eventually withdrawn they remained hurt and angry. They had lost 
the power to control their own destiny: Castro never quite trusted Khrushchev 
again.

Yet the Cubans certainly won a small victory, securing a tacit assurance from 
the Americans that the Bay of Pigs would not be repeated — an assurance that 
has lasted for 50 years. It has even survived the collapse of the Soviet Union 
itself.

Most of the world thought that Khrushchev had gambled and lost. The Chinese in 
particular thought he had behaved in an irresponsible fashion, and stepped up 
the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet politburo had a similar view, and two years 
later they quietly removed Khrushchev from power.

The Cubans remained distrustful of the Soviets (and of their allies within the 
Communist party of Cuba), and they did not finally sign up as a loyal member of 
the Soviet camp until the end of the 1960s.

The impact and significance of the missile crisis will be argued about for 
another half-century and beyond. Yet, although dramatic, it may not have been 
as important as other seminal events of that decade — the assassination of 
president Kennedy a year later, and the stepping up of the attacks on North 
Vietnam the year after that.

The crisis was certainly an important milestone, and it may have made the great 
powers more careful. It may also have speeded up the signing of the test-ban 
treaty of 1963, a worthwhile legacy in itself. It also allowed the Cuban 
revolution to survive. It may have been a foolish and dangerous strategy on 
Khrushchev’s part, but it worked. — The Guardian, London

The writer is the author of Cuba: A New History.


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