http://www.smh.com.au/world/no-good-options-alqaeda-challenge-in-syria-20130412-2hqw2.html
No good options: al-Qaeda challenge in Syria Date April 13, 2013 Brian Fishman a.. War footing: A Jabhat al-Nusra fighter runs as the Islamist group's base is shelled in Raqqah province in northern Syria, where it is said to have a strong presence. Photo: Reuters WASHINGTON: As soon as peaceful protests against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad turned violent in mid-2011, it was clear that al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq - known as the Islamic State of Iraq - would play a terrible role shaping the country's future. That reality was re-emphasised this week, when ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi acknowledged that his organisation had founded the pre-eminent Syrian jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusra. Baghdadi then renamed their collective enterprise the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIGS). Kudos to Baghdadi for confirming what has long been known. The US had already listed Jabhat al-Nusra as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq last December, and the basic relationship between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of al-Qaeda was easy to surmise when Jabhat al-Nusra officially declared its existence in January last year. It's no surprise ISI was quickly able to establish a foothold in Syria: the group had built extensive networks in the country since early in the Iraq War, and was reasserting itself in eastern Iraq, which shares a 600-kilometre-long border with Syria, long before the uprising against Assad began. One conclusion to be drawn from the creation of the ISIGS is that al-Qaeda's titular head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is still involved in the operations of the terrorist group's regional affiliates. An audio statement from Zawahiri last Sunday urged Jabhat al-Nusra to establish an Islamic state. Baghdadi's subsequent declaration of unity only a day or so later suggests either a high-degree of co-ordination with Zawahiri's PR team, or that he jumps quickly when the head man gives an order. Zawahiri's apparent ability to affect al-Qaeda's strategy in the Levant is somewhat surprising. Since Osama bin Laden's death, he is the world's most wanted man, and a series of US strikes on al-Qaeda's communication network after the bin Laden raid must have forced him deeper underground. However, it is hard to believe that the timing of the Zawahiri and Baghdadi statements are a coincidence. It seems that Zawahiri - like bin Laden before him - remains relevant to the operations of the network he heads. But if Zawahiri's continuing influence has been clarified, his judgment remains suspect. It wouldn't be the first time he botched the group's strategy in the region. In June 2006, he urged al-Qaeda in Iraq to declare an Islamic state in a eulogy for the group's slain leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. At the time, Zawahiri was worried that a precipitous US withdrawal from Iraq would lead to internecine fighting among Iraq's Sunnis, similar to the situation among Afghan mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal in 19-89. His diagnosis may have been accurate, but his prescription of an Islamic state was a disaster for the al-Qaeda affiliate. The group tried to tighten its grip on governance, but only hastened the Sunni backlash known as the Awakening movement, a breakdown facilitated by extreme pressure on the al-Qaeda network by US forces. Considering Zawahiri's previous strategic thinking, on might wonder whether his reasoning is similar when it comes to Syria. Perhaps the al-Qaeda leader imagines Jabhat al-Nusra and the ISI can forge a governing framework that will allow them to supplant their rivals after Assad falls. The answer may be simpler. Al-Qaeda's role in Jabhat al-Nusra is widely acknowledged, making hiding behind localised branding no longer feasible. Considering that reality, it makes sense that the ISI - which fundamentally rejects the legitimacy of existing borders in the Middle East - would broaden its overt claim on territory, including parts of Syria. The public unification of the ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra may not be universally popular - especially among Syrian recruits attracted primarily by the group's military and organisational effectiveness, rather than its ideology. That may explain Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani's disjointed statement released on Wednesday, in which he affirmed his allegiance to Zawahiri but rejected the idea of renaming Jabhat al-Nusra and reassured supporters that the group's operations would not change. Just as the ISI never threatened to control all of Iraq, the ISIGS is unlikely to attempt to control all of Syria. Rather, it will aim for the Sunni-dominated expanse between the Shia heartland in southern Iraq and the Assad-controlled highlands in western Syria. Whatever Zawahiri's rationale, this declaration carries risks for al-Qaeda's operation in Syria. In Iraq, the ISI earned a reputation as brutal and domineering. Jabhat al-Nusra has avoided some of those mistakes by collaborating with a range of Syrian militant groups, and has also effectively delivered specific services. But the declaration of an Islamic state will carry with it certain expectations from al-Qaeda's jihadi supporters, just as it did seven years ago in Iraq. One of those expectations is that the group will exercise control over territory - and that will mean confronting tribal groups and other Syrian rebels that may not be on board with Jabhat al-Nusra's extremist vision. Even so, the reckoning between al-Qaeda's Syria affiliate and other rebels groups is beginning. The unification of Jabhat al-Nusra and the ISI is likely to have a larger impact politically than it will operationally. The US declaration that Jabhat al-Nusra was an al-Qaeda affiliate may not have deterred states sponsoring militant groups in Syria; those states will hopefully be more discerning now about which groups receive arms and resources. But the US still finds itself largely powerless to stop the terrorist organisation. It simply does not have any good policy options in Syria, even though Jabhat al-Nusra's new branding may lower the legal hurdles to targeting it with drones. Its strategy must prioritise containing Syria's unconventional weapons. It would be a disaster if Assad transfers them to the Lebanese paramilitary organisation Hezbollah, but it would be even worse if they fall into the arms of al-Qaeda. There are no euphemisms to conceal the human tragedy and geopolitical disaster that is unfolding in Syria. Assad must go for there to be peace. But so long as Jabhat al-Nusra remains the most powerful rebel group on the ground, Syria cannot even begin the hard work of rebuilding. Foreign Policy [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
