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      Nationalism, Minority Rights and Citizenship in Indonesia      
      Written by Lauren Gumbs     
      Monday, 06 May 2013  
        
             
            The faithful at prayer 
      Unity in Diversity or Unity in Similarity?

      As many as 170,000 Indonesians were forced to flee their homes in 2012 
because of ethnic and religious tensions, according to a Global Overview of 
forced migration published by authors with the US Department of State, the 
UNHCR and the Research Institute Without Walls.

      That is an indication of how Indonesia's dynamism means that while it is 
growing into a major economic power, it is also struggling to deal effectively 
with issues such as ethnic conflict, religious intolerance, corruption, and 
inequality. 

      The country's diversity, including at least 14 major and minor ethnic 
groups spread across 17,000 islands, has been and still is being squeezed into 
something that is recognizable and manageable across all corners of the 
republic. 

      Ethnic and religious conflict remain a significant hindrance to nation 
building. State responses to minority claims on rights and mass homogenization 
have swung between military repression, accommodation, coercion and even 
transmigration. 

      Some of these strains stem from nationalist projects of the late 
strongman Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998), when aggressive nation 
building was a key theme and often involved violent military force against 
non-conformist subjects. 

      Citizenship has changed meaning over time and is no longer as rigid as in 
the New Order era, yet at this point Indonesia is neither convincingly plural 
nor multicultural. 

      The legacy of forced homogeneity is difficult to shake off, as are the 
pressures that manufacture conformity. Contemporary nationalist projects adopt 
differing approaches toward diverse ethnic and religious groups. Some 
approaches are constructive, others are not. 

      The social and political situation for minorities continues; particularly 
as recent events illustrate that the capacity for violent conflict in Indonesia 
has not been restrained.

      Nationalism remains a persistent theme but it is an artificial solidarity 
that masks divisions and hinders solutions. 

      The state philosophy, Pancasila is meant to capture the principle of 
'unity in diversity'. It is a euphemistic mantra for an explosive environment 
of inclusion and exclusion that often results in human rights abuses and a 
contingent notion of citizenship that entails highly unequal social contracts. 

      East Timor is a comparative success story, having gained 
self-determination, but only after a protracted and bloody civil war. Acehnese 
and Papuan autonomy has been accommodated to a certain extent. 

      However Aceh can now subject the Indonesian citizens that live in the 
province to controversial Shariah governance that elsewhere in Indonesia would 
undermine basic human rights as well as cause democratic backpedalling. 

      Papua is still swarming with Indonesian military due to sustained 
movements for sovereignty. Deadly clashes in the restive provinces between pro- 
independence members and military are commonplace. 

      Unresolved issues lead to disputes even though Aceh for example is far 
more comfortable with its current situation than Papua is. A fracas this week 
over whether the Aceh regional flag is unlawful because it too closely 
resembles the former GAM (Free Aceh Movement) flag, showed that Indonesia will 
not easily relinquish control over its territory or its citizens' ideological 
beliefs. Remembering the decades-long armed insurgency that nearly lost 
Indonesia the resource-rich area, Jakarta is probably concerned that GAM 
symbols reference lingering sentiment for independence. On the other hand, 
Jakarta is right to be wary. Conservative Islamists adopt competing nationalist 
ideologies that impose even more polarization into mainstream norms. Majority 
rights still trump minority ones and even non-conformists in the majority are 
quickly shut down. 

      This year an attempt by a 75 year old grandfather in Aceh, who sought a 
court order for a mosque to turn the volume down on the call to prayer, was 
interpreted as a challenge to Islamic dominance. His attempt failed and he 
became the subject of death threats. 

      Indonesians reconcile Islamic belief with democracy in their own way, 
which is arguably either good for democracy or good for Islam. This week a Pew 
report stated that seven in 10 Indonesians want Shariah law implemented in the 
legal code, even though many social scientists and Islamic scholars have found 
that most Indonesians are moderate and secular. 

      In this bipolar environment of democratization and Islamization, the 
pressure of competing forces is contradictory. Conservative Islamic aspirations 
are broadly accommodated, through bylaws (new Shariah based bylaws are added 
each year, not removed) and legislation. This mainstreams such things as bans 
on homosexuality and outside faiths needing permits. 

      Such norms produce indifference to intolerant activities as these 
activities are seen as protecting the status quo and contributing to the 
nationalist project of unifying citizens. It also over emphasises the 
ethno-cultural-nationalist focus. 

      Christians in some parts of Indonesia, particularly West Java, suffer 
under discriminatory laws and by-laws that suppress their religious identity or 
reduce it to specific limits of acceptance. Other areas such as Malang city in 
East Java are comparably tolerant. Christian and ethnic communities such as 
Chinese and Hindus are undisturbed. 

      However, the fact that arbitrary conditions can be mandated for Christian 
places of worship and to restrict proselytising, signifies insecurity and a 
lack of enforcement of minority rights. It is testament to state apathy and 
consent that in particularly tense regions, sites of worship are policed by 
thug-like Islamist groups with little police objection. 

      Many churches find that they cannot secure necessary permits due to an 
impasse with residents, local leaders, and regional heads of government. 
Churches that are accused of operating without a permit become the targets of 
harassment and intimidation from Islamists or are shut down by authorities. 

      Diversity does not apply to just anyone. Some identities are completely 
unrecognized. Last year Alexander Ang was beaten up at work by colleagues for 
his atheist beliefs (discovered on Facebook) and subsequently jailed under the 
blasphemy law. 

      Even unity in diversity cannot override blasphemy, and yet neither 
Pancasila nor the state establishes a defence for such injustice. Atheist 
identities are anonymous, both in the national ideology of Pancasila, whose 
first article is belief in the one and only God, and when individuals are 
systematically categorised by the many identification documents that require 
them to list a religion. 

      The state approves just six acceptable religions?not including atheism, 
Judaism, Animism and polytheistic beliefs. Sim cards, cable television, even 
hairdressers and beauty salons, request an individual's religion on their 
registration lists. Supposedly secular schools contain mission statements 
acknowledging devotion to God as first priority, assuming unanimous belief in a 
monotheistic God. 

      Students are taught a deity-neutral prayer that they parrot before 
classes and meals. What is worse than adults having to constantly decide who 
and what they are, is children being categorized before they even understand 
what it means to own a hereditary identity. Systematic categorisation and 
documentation of potentially discriminatory aspects of identity reinforces 
social and political margins of belonging. 

      The tug of war between diversity and homogeneity has rarely conferred 
legally certain equal minority rights. Religious groups such as the Ahmadiyah 
and Shia, who live among mainstream Muslims, have been attacked, oppressed and 
exiled from their communities. Such is their stigma that West Lombok regional 
heads have even suggested Ahmadis be relocated to an island for their own 
protection. 

      At this time, for instance, 20 Ahmadiyah followers are waiting in their 
mosque, sealed by local government, for the West Java Bekasi administration to 
allow them to practice their religion freely, without having to remove 'Islam' 
and their connection to it from all references or from having their Imams 
chosen for them. 

      A 2008 joint ministerial decree and West Java gubernatorial decree banned 
Ahmadis from propagating their beliefs, in spite of the 1945 Constitution 
guaranteeing freedom of religious belief to minorities. 

      Civil society organisations (CSOs) can strengthen social solidarity by 
employing the language of human rights rhetoric to push for ethnic and cultural 
minority rights. 

      Indonesia's strengthening civil society can work against homogenizing 
pressures to solidify elements of civic nationalism into the prevailing but 
unworkable ethno-cultural nationalism, to empower an equal, participative 
political community rather than marginalising and suppressing difference. 

      For example, in reaction to the Bekasi Ahmadis' plight, groups for 
pluralism and religious freedom marched in Jakarta to decry the government's 
inaction in addressing religious intolerance. The government's apathetic 
approach to certain minority groups, and unwillingness to monitor police and 
local government bias, is now backfiring as civil organisations have become 
more vocal and politicised. 

      Protests might not yet have forced President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's 
hand, or resulted in secure legislation, however ongoing mobilisation and 
politicisation of rights issues and citizenship through the lens of civic 
nationalism, will have a better chance of success, especially if civil society 
organisations operate in a conducive environment. 

      Civic engagement faces many challenges, not least a pending Bill on Mass 
Organisations (ORMAS) that would place authoritarian restrictions on civil 
society organisations. 

      Indonesia today is thus both a minefield of conflict and tension as well 
as a reservoir of patience and forbearance whose people have to put up with a 
lot. Their leaders perpetuate extractive political and economic systems, 
poverty affects more than half the population, and a history of violence and 
disorder has embedded a culture of police and military impunity. 

      Corruption is a way of life. Graft scandals involving elites are a weekly 
spectacle in the news. The abundance of natural resources and their subsequent 
exploitation, has not translated into a better quality of life for most, 
despite the buzz around the expanding middle class. 

      Social justice in society is improving slowly with excruciating steps 
from democratizing elements and civil society. A civic approach to nationalism 
alternatively adopts the view that minorities are equal rights bearing 
citizens, making human rights language-recognition of claims holders and 
obligations of duty bearers-more explicit.

      The tension of consolidating the national identity of such a vast expanse 
of island habitats and their inhabitants is portrayed in the struggle for the 
power to control, limit, express and define legitimate patriotic identities 
through narrow nationalist ethnic and cultural terms. 

      'Unity in diversity' conceals a hegemony that interprets diversity 
inflexibly. Instead of pluralism and diversity, it is in fact homogeneity that 
is employed to glue together the diverse regional ethnic and religious 
identities of 242 million people. 

      In the midst of conflict and intolerance, it seems like the nationalist 
focus leads to a self perception that defines individuals only in relation to 
what they are not, therefore continually creating an 'Other'. Indonesia is 
large and there are multitudes of examples of tolerance and pluralism, however 
ethnic and cultural diversity continues to challenge the mainstream 
sufficiently enough to incite conflict, intolerance, and discrimination and to 
render citizenship status insecure.
     


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