> However, I don't see this "distinguishability" as a MUST as long as: > > 1) MIPv6 MUST NOT require all processing of routing headers be enabled in > MN's
Just MNs? Or hosts in general? It isn't obvious to me from reading RFC 2460 whether a host can drop packets with routing headers instead of resubmitting them for transmissing to the next hop. > 2) MIPv6 MUST require a special case for routing header processing that > is sufficiently secure. > > 3)IPv6 SHOULD/MUST state (given 1,2) that nodes SHOULD NOT/MUST NOT > enable routing header processing on hosts by default > > ( one could argue that currently, RFC2460 requires they must be processed > [due to MIPv6] -- not all share my interpretation on this ) There is other use of routing headers such as being able to remotely do a traceroute from the other end by source routing the packets through that host. > That is, if we can say quickly enough "routing headers cannot harm your > hosts!" they might not be taken as a security threat, and > distinguishability would not be required. > But really, IMO the tougher issue is how HAO will/should be handled. Do you see issues with only accepting packets with HAOpt when the receipient has a matching binding cache entry? That seems to be the simplest approach to me. Of course there are some details e.g. on how the MN discovers that the CN has garbage collected the BCE but I think an ICMP error can handle that (but I haven't thought enough about that). Erik -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPng Working Group Mailing List IPng Home Page: http://playground.sun.com/ipng FTP archive: ftp://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng Direct all administrative requests to [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------
