Eliot Lear wrote:
> Tony Hain wrote:
> > Assuming 'inherently' means 'well-known', yes it is true 
> that manually 
> > configured filtering does not *require* a well-known prefix. It is 
> > also true that automation is required for consumers. Just 
> because it 
> > is possible to do manual filtering doesn't invalidate the 
> requirement 
> > for automated simplicity.
> > 
> > We need to stop propagating the idea that requirements are invalid 
> > when - 'if the user was educated they would just do it my way, and 
> > they aren't educated so they shouldn't be doing it'. By definition 
> > consumers will not be technically educated, so approaches 
> that work in 
> > a large managed network will simply fail. They need something as 
> > simple as; light switches by default are only accessible 
> internal to 
> > the home,  but if say the front porch light needs to be 
> exposed they 
> > can explicitly configure it to be global.
> 
> Once again, Tony, you are putting forth a security solution 
> that is not 
> secure.  You cannot *ARCHITECT* security into a protocol 
> based on an IP 
> address.  It is one thing for the customers to do that- they 
> *may* know 
> their environments.  As we have seen with all sorts of spyware and 
> viruses, they probably do not.  It's thus even worse when you 
> architect 
> a standard based on what are false assumptions today and are 
> likely to 
> be false assumptions in the future.
> 
> The solution to the problem you have raised is a standard enrollment 
> protocol that is invoked between an element and a security management 
> tool.  That tool itself must be made user friendly.  You're trying to 
> solve the problem at the wrong level.  Leave the IP address 
> out of the 
> argument.

I don't see any content in this message. Like it or not, it is accepted
security practice to limit access by filtering on bits in the IP header, and
restricting what prefixes are announced in routing protocols. One set of
bits in the header is just as valid to filter on as another, though
addresses are easier to find and consistently exposed. In any case, I was
not even claiming that any packet filtering was happening in that scenario.
The presumption was that the prefix for local use was not being routed
outside the home, while the global one was. In that case, packet filtering
is not required as the origin can't get packets to the destination.
Restricted routing is just one component in a comprehensive security plan.

Tony




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