> On Sep 28, 2015, at 4:11 PM, Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> We did update cryptographic algorithms for ESP and AH
> (RFC4305->4835->7321), but we have never updated the RFC4307.
> 
> I think there should be update for that document too, as it now
> defines following madantory to implement algorithms:
> 
> 1024 MODP Group, ENCR_3DES, PRF_HMAC_SHA1, AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96.
> 
> And I think at least the 1024-bit MODP groupp, and perhaps the 3DES
> also should be changed to something more suitable. For exmple 2048-bit
> MODP group and ENCR_AES_CBC...
> 
> We had this discussion about two years ago last time, but nothing came
> out from there (Hmm.. did I promise to do something, I hope not).
> 
> Perhaps this time? 

Totally yes.

      Group Number        Bit Length            Status     Defined
      2                   1024 MODP Group       MUST-      [RFC2409]



   MUST-      This term means the same as MUST.  However, we expect at
              some point that this algorithm will no longer be a MUST in
              a future document.  Although its status will be determined
              at a later time, it is reasonable to expect that if a
              future revision of a document alters the status of a MUST-
              algorithm, it will remain at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD-.


“Some point” has arrived, and I don’t think group #2 should even be SHOULD- at 
this point.

So what should we specify now?  My opinion:

DH Groups
   14: MUST
   19: SHOULD+

Type 1 algorithms:
   ENCR_AES_CBC: MUST-
   AES-GCM with 16 octet ICV: MUST
   ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305: SHOULD+
   
Type 2 algorithm:
   PRF_HMAC_SHA1: MUST-
   PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256: MUST
   PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512: SHOULD+
   
Type 3 algorithm:
   AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96: MUST-
   AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128: MUST
   AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256: SHOULD+  (or maybe AUTH_AES_256_GMAC??)

Yoav
   
_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

Reply via email to