The draft provides postquantum protection to any SA, regardless
of the authentication methods used. In other words, PPKs (as specified in the
draft)
don't replace preshred keys authentication in IKEv2, they augment
any authentication method to provide postquantum security.
The original title to me reads like a "new feature" instead of like a
"fix for old feature".
But then PaulH is wrong and this draft is a lot more then fixing just
IKEv2 PSK for postquantum.
Doesn't this new feature fixes IKEv2 preshared key auth?
I don't think PaulH is wrong, this draft just offers a bit more.
Paul
Valery.
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