I think we should definitely add a discussion around this to the Berlin agenda.
>From our end, we definitely want to see some measures to add quantum >resistance into IKEv2 to promote the adoption of IKEv2 over IKEv1 for clients >that are concerned. I think draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2 provides a good starting >point for a WG document to do that. I agree that we can defer some of the >complexities around ID hiding to later solutions, in the interest of >simplicity and providing basic QR in the short term. Thanks, Tommy Pauly Apple > On Jul 4, 2016, at 9:40 AM, Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, 4 Jul 2016, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote: > >> Actually, the draft is a bolt-on to existing authentication methods; > >> You might object "how is this different from a having a possibly global >> authentication key"; > >> Because of this, it wouldn't appear to be advisable to wait for the full >> solution; for people who are concerned about Quantum Computers, it would be >> appropriate to have a short term solution. In my mind, it's OK if the short >> term solution doesn't address all possible scenarios; it's sufficient if it >> provides a way to address the immediate need for those people who are >> concerned. > > In that case, I feel we are back at making a much simpler solution of > providing a key identifier that leads to an additional mixing in of > SKEYSEED generation. And not add methods of ID hiding. And have > something that can be tested by implementations using a shared OTP. > > If the people discussing this will be in Berlin, perhaps we should put > this on the agenda to discuss? > > Paul > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
