> I'm proposing it is time to change this to MUST NOT for 4307bis.


+1 

On 09/10/16 23:26, "IPsec on behalf of Paul Wouters"
<ipsec-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of p...@nohats.ca> wrote:

>
>Released a few days ago:
>
>       http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/961
>
>       A kilobit hidden SNFS discrete logarithm computation
>       Joshua Fried and Pierrick Gaudry and Nadia Heninger and Emmanuel Thomé
>
>       We perform a special number field sieve discrete logarithm
>       computation in a 1024-bit prime field. To our knowledge, this
>       is the first kilobit-sized discrete logarithm computation ever
>       reported for prime fields. This computation took a little over
>       two months of calendar time on an academic cluster using the
>       open-source CADO-NFS software.
>
>Basically, this paper shows how to make a DH group of 1024 modp
>with a backdoor, in two months of academic computing resources,
>
>The paper mentions 5114 a few times:
>
>       RFC 5114 [33] specifies a number of groups for use with
>       Diffie-Hellman, and states that the parameters were drawn
>       from NIST test data, but neither the NIST test data [39] nor
>       RFC 5114 itself contain the seeds used to generate the finite
>       field parameters
>
>And concludes:
>
>       Both from this perspective, and from our more modern one, dismissing the
>       risk of trapdoored primes in real usage appears to have been a mistake,
>       as the apparent difficulties encountered by the trapdoor designer in
>1992
>       turn out to be easily circumvented. A more conservative design decision
>       for FIPS 186 would have required mandatory seed publication instead of
>       making it optional.  As a result, there are opaque, standardized
>1024-bit
>       and 2048-bit primes in wide use today that cannot be properly verified.
>
>This is the strongest statement yet that I've seen to not trust any
>of the RFC-5114 groups.
>
>The latest 4307bis document has these groups (22-24) as SHOULD NOT,
>stating:
>
>       Group 22, 23 and 24 or 1024-bit MODP Group with 160-bit, and
>       2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit and 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup
>       have small subgroups, which means that checks specified in the
>       "Additional Diffie-Hellman Test for the IKEv2" [RFC6989] section
>       2.2 first bullet point MUST be done when these groups are used.
>       These groups are also not safe-primes.  The seeds for these groups
>       have not been publicly released, resulting in reduced trust in
>       these groups.  These groups were proposed as alternatives for
>       group 2 and 14 but never saw wide deployment.  It is expected
>       in the near future to be further downgraded to MUST NOT.
>
>I'm proposing it is time to change this to MUST NOT for 4307bis.
>
>Possibly, we should do this via SAAG in general, and then follow SAAG's
>advise in IPSECME.
>
>Is there _any_ reason why group 22-24 should not be MUST NOT ?
>
>Paul
>
>_______________________________________________
>IPsec mailing list
>IPsec@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec

Reply via email to