OSPFv3 authentication (RFC4552) mandate to use manual key, the reason is OSPFv3 uses multicast. So I could see manual key IPsec could be needed in any multicast applications since group key management is not widely available For above reason, I think it should be "MAY" instead of "SHOULD NOT"
> -----Original Message----- > From: IPsec [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Tero Kivinen > Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 8:11 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: [IPsec] RFC4301, rfc7321bis and Manual keys > > The RFC4301 requires support for manual keys (section 4.5), but I hope > nobody really uses them. The rfc7321bis provides mandatory to implement > algorithms for the IKEv2 use, and does not really specifically cover manual > keys > cases, but it does not really say that manual keyed SAs are out of scope > either > (like it does say for IKEv1). > > The issue is that some of the conformance logo documents actually do require > manual keys, and to gain those logos implementors need to add support for > manual keyed SAs even when nobody is really going to use them (i.e., adding > support for manual keys for android VPN client seems little stupid). > > On the other hand if you use the rfc7321bis requirements for also manual keys, > there is only one suggested cipher that can be used, namely ENCR_AES_CBC. > > None of the counter mode ciphers are safe to use with manual keys, and for > example RFC4106 (AES-GCM) requires using automated key management. > The RFC4309 (AES-CCM) says that it "should not be used with statically > configured keys", and that "MUST use fress keys". RFC7634 > (Chacha20-poly1305) does not explictly say anything about manual keys, but > says it gets bitstring called KEYMAT from IKE... > > If we assume rfc7431bis can be used with manual keys too, we need to add > some more text saying these ciphers cannot be used with manual keys. > > Anyways, I think it should be time to mark manual keys as SHOULD NOT. > We had it in 4301 as MUST to implement as we assumed that it could be used > to fill in keying material from other source than IKE to the IPsec > architecture. I > do not think that is really happening, I think those other automated key > management systems will also generate dynamic keys, and are feeding them in > using similar APIs we have for IKEv2. Also manual keys were useful when doing > initial IPsec testing in interops, but I have not used them for that purposes > in > last decade or so... > > Perhaps we should add note to the rfc7431bis that manual keys SHOULD NOT > be used, and mark it as updating RFC4301? > > Or should we have separate RFC stating that? > > I do not want to change it to MUST NOT as that would require people to > remove parts of their implementations to stay complient, but on the other > hand I do not want people to wasting their time to implenting interface to > configure manual keys when nobody is going to use them. > -- > [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
