Thank you for your comment.
We want to ensure the existing systems can use these newer certificates as if
nothing changed. That’s the key requirement. If the Signature field is
modified, the systems that have not been updated will not be able to use
classic algorithms as they do today. Placing signatures in the non-critical
extensions leaves the Signature field untouched.
Alex
On 2017-10-03, 4:48 PM, "Santosh Chokhani" <santosh.chokh...@gmail.com> wrote:
Multiple public keys as well as signatures can be accommodated using the
respective algorithm OIDs in Signature and SPKI fields.
Have you considered that in place of using an extension.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alexander Truskovsky [mailto:alexander.truskov...@isara.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 3, 2017 4:38 PM
To: santosh.chokh...@gmail.com; david.walterm...@nist.gov; kivi...@iki.fi;
hous...@vigilsec.com
Cc: sp...@ietf.org; e...@rtfm.com; hous...@vigilsec.com;
scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com; ipsec@ietf.org; kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com;
itu-t-liai...@iab.org; jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [lamps] New Liaison Statement, "LS on ITU-T SG17 work
on quantum-safe PKI"
This allows X.509 certificates to contain two (or more) public keys and
issuer signatures. The goal would be to ease the migration of PKI and
dependent protocols to new digital signature algorithms. The motivation was to
make the X.509 more cryptographically agile and simplify the migration to
quantum-safe algorithms, but it is algorithm agnostic. The main benefit of
this proposal is that current systems will be able to use these newer X.509
certificates as they do today without any modifications, while systems that
were updated to support quantum-safe algorithms can also be updated to
understand the newer X.509 format and use quantum-safe algorithm instead.
We are working on a draft that mirrors the ITU-T’s work with a few partners
and will publish it for review soon.
Alex
On 2017-10-02, 9:58 PM, "IPsec on behalf of Santosh Chokhani"
<ipsec-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of santosh.chokh...@gmail.com> wrote:
I am not sure I understand what is being said below. The link to
the PDF
does not add to the message body.
If there is a concern about what signature algorithm is used for
what type
of subject key, X.509 already has that flexibility.
If there is a concern about using multiple signatures on an X.509
certificate, one can use the single signature algorithm identifier
to define
multiple algorithms, parameters, and signatures.
-----Original Message-----
From: Spasm [mailto:spasm-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Liaison
Statement
Management Tool
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2017 11:25 AM
To: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>; Tero Kivinen
<kivi...@iki.fi>; Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Discussion List
<sp...@ietf.org>; Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com>; Russ Housley
<hous...@vigilsec.com>; Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi>; Scott
Mansfield
<scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com>; IP Security Maintenance and
Extensions
Discussion List <ipsec@ietf.org>; Kathleen Moriarty
<kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com>; David Waltermire
<david.walterm...@nist.gov>; itu-t-liai...@iab.org;
jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
Subject: [lamps] New Liaison Statement, "LS on ITU-T SG17 work on
quantum-safe PKI"
Title: LS on ITU-T SG17 work on quantum-safe PKI Submission Date:
2017-09-13
URL of the IETF Web page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1541/
From: Jean-Paul Lemaire <jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr>
To: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>,Tero Kivinen
<kivi...@iki.fi>,Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>
Cc: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>,IP Security
Maintenance and
Extensions Discussion List
<ipsec@ietf.org>,itu-t-liai...@iab.org,Limited
Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Discussion List
<sp...@ietf.org>,Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>,Scott Mansfield
<scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com>,Kathleen Moriarty
<kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com>,Tero Kivinen
<kivi...@iki.fi>,Eric
Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> Response Contacts:
jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
Technical Contacts:
Purpose: For information
Body: ITU-T Study Group 17 is pleased to inform you that in our
August/September 2017 meeting we agreed to start work on the
inclusion of a
proposal to include optional support for multiple public-key
algorithms in
Recommendation ITU-T X509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8.
The industry is preparing ICT systems to be resistant to attacks by
large-scale quantum computers in addition to more sophisticated
attacks by
conventional computing resources. Proposed was an optional feature
to the
X.509 certificate that provides a seamless migration capability to
existing
PKI systems, and is completely backwardly compatible with existing
systems.
While public-key key establishment algorithms are typically
negotiated
between peers and are generally fairly simple to update, the
authentication
systems typically rely on a single digital signature algorithm
which are
more difficult to update. This is because of the circular
dependency between
PKI-based identity systems and the dependent communication
protocols. In
order to update a PKI system, one would typically need to create a
duplicate
PKI system that utilizes a new digital signature algorithm and then
migrate
all the dependent systems one by one.
This proposal eliminates the need to create such duplicate PKI
systems by
adding optional extensions to contain alternate public key and
alternate
signature, and a method for the CA to sign certificates using a
layered
approach to ensure that every attribute is authenticated by both
signatures.
The resulting certificate, while containing new quantum safe public
key and
signature, can still be used by existing systems relying on the
classic
public key and signature.
Attachments:
sp16-sg17-oLS-00068
https://www.ietf.org/lib/dt/documents/LIAISON/liaison-2017-09-13-itu-t-sg-17
-ipsecme-lamps-ls-on-itu-t-sg17-work-on-quantum-safe-pki-attachment-1.pdf
_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
sp...@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
_______________________________________________
IPsec mailing list
IPsec@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
