Hi Santosh,

I do not understand your claim that you can have multiple public keys and 
signatures within the base structure of a certificate.

Erik

-----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
Fra: Spasm [mailto:spasm-boun...@ietf.org] På vegne af Santosh Chokhani
Sendt: 03 October 2017 22:49
Til: 'Alexander Truskovsky' <alexander.truskov...@isara.com>; 
david.walterm...@nist.gov; kivi...@iki.fi; hous...@vigilsec.com
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; e...@rtfm.com; hous...@vigilsec.com; 
scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com; sp...@ietf.org; kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com; 
itu-t-liai...@iab.org; jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
Emne: Re: [lamps] [IPsec] New Liaison Statement, "LS on ITU-T SG17 work on 
quantum-safe PKI"

Multiple public keys as well as signatures can be accommodated using the 
respective algorithm OIDs in Signature and SPKI fields.

Have you considered that in place of using an extension.

-----Original Message-----
From: Alexander Truskovsky [mailto:alexander.truskov...@isara.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 3, 2017 4:38 PM
To: santosh.chokh...@gmail.com; david.walterm...@nist.gov; kivi...@iki.fi; 
hous...@vigilsec.com
Cc: sp...@ietf.org; e...@rtfm.com; hous...@vigilsec.com; 
scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com; ipsec@ietf.org; kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com; 
itu-t-liai...@iab.org; jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [lamps] New Liaison Statement, "LS on ITU-T SG17 work on 
quantum-safe PKI"

This allows X.509 certificates to contain two (or more) public keys and issuer 
signatures.  The goal would be to ease the migration of PKI and dependent 
protocols to new digital signature algorithms.  The motivation was to make the 
X.509 more cryptographically agile and simplify the migration to quantum-safe 
algorithms, but it is algorithm agnostic.  The main benefit of this proposal is 
that current systems will be able to use these newer X.509 certificates as they 
do today without any modifications, while systems that were updated to support 
quantum-safe algorithms can also be updated to understand the newer X.509 
format and use quantum-safe algorithm instead.

We are working on a draft that mirrors the ITU-T’s work with a few partners and 
will publish it for review soon.

Alex
    
    
    On 2017-10-02, 9:58 PM, "IPsec on behalf of Santosh Chokhani" 
<ipsec-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of santosh.chokh...@gmail.com> wrote:
    
        I am not sure I understand what is being said below.  The link to the 
PDF
        does not add to the message body.
        
        If there is a concern about what signature algorithm is used for what 
type
        of subject key, X.509 already has that flexibility.
        
        If there is a concern about using multiple signatures on an X.509
        certificate, one can use the single signature algorithm identifier to 
define
        multiple algorithms, parameters, and signatures.
        
        -----Original Message-----
        From: Spasm [mailto:spasm-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Liaison 
Statement
        Management Tool
        Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2017 11:25 AM
        To: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>; Tero Kivinen
        <kivi...@iki.fi>; Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>
        Cc: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Discussion List
        <sp...@ietf.org>; Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com>; Russ Housley
        <hous...@vigilsec.com>; Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi>; Scott Mansfield
        <scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com>; IP Security Maintenance and Extensions
        Discussion List <ipsec@ietf.org>; Kathleen Moriarty
        <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com>; David Waltermire
        <david.walterm...@nist.gov>; itu-t-liai...@iab.org;
        jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
        Subject: [lamps] New Liaison Statement, "LS on ITU-T SG17 work on
        quantum-safe PKI"
        
        Title: LS on ITU-T SG17 work on quantum-safe PKI Submission Date: 
2017-09-13
        URL of the IETF Web page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1541/
        
        From: Jean-Paul Lemaire <jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr>
        To: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>,Tero Kivinen
        <kivi...@iki.fi>,Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>
        Cc: David Waltermire <david.walterm...@nist.gov>,IP Security 
Maintenance and
        Extensions Discussion List 
<ipsec@ietf.org>,itu-t-liai...@iab.org,Limited
        Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Discussion List
        <sp...@ietf.org>,Russ Housley <hous...@vigilsec.com>,Scott Mansfield
        <scott.mansfi...@ericsson.com>,Kathleen Moriarty
        <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com>,Tero Kivinen <kivi...@iki.fi>,Eric
        Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> Response Contacts:
        jean-paul.lema...@univ-paris-diderot.fr
        Technical Contacts: 
        Purpose: For information
        
        Body: ITU-T Study Group 17 is pleased to inform you that in our
        August/September 2017 meeting we agreed to start work on the inclusion 
of a
        proposal to include optional support for multiple public-key algorithms 
in
        Recommendation ITU-T X509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8.
        
        The industry is preparing ICT systems to be resistant to attacks by
        large-scale quantum computers in addition to more sophisticated attacks 
by
        conventional computing resources. Proposed was an optional feature to 
the
        X.509 certificate that provides a seamless migration capability to 
existing
        PKI systems, and is completely backwardly compatible with existing 
systems.
        
        While public-key key establishment algorithms are typically negotiated
        between peers and are generally fairly simple to update, the 
authentication
        systems typically rely on a single digital signature algorithm which are
        more difficult to update. This is because of the circular dependency 
between
        PKI-based identity systems and the dependent communication protocols. In
        order to update a PKI system, one would typically need to create a 
duplicate
        PKI system that utilizes a new digital signature algorithm and then 
migrate
        all the dependent systems one by one.
        
        This proposal eliminates the need to create such duplicate PKI systems 
by
        adding optional extensions to contain alternate public key and alternate
        signature, and a method for the CA to sign certificates using a layered
        approach to ensure that every attribute is authenticated by both 
signatures.
        The resulting certificate, while containing new quantum safe public key 
and
        signature, can still be used by existing systems relying on the classic
        public key and signature.
        Attachments:
        
            sp16-sg17-oLS-00068
         
        
https://www.ietf.org/lib/dt/documents/LIAISON/liaison-2017-09-13-itu-t-sg-17
        
-ipsecme-lamps-ls-on-itu-t-sg17-work-on-quantum-safe-pki-attachment-1.pdf
        
        _______________________________________________
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        sp...@ietf.org
        https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
        
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        https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
        
    
    


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