On Nov 21, 2018, at 23:04, Warren Kumari <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > > Well, if you removed the DNSSEC_TA bit, and expected enterprise tools to do > this through "normal" enterprise tools methods this would work.
That is basically what we did with the mandatory white list, except now the internal zones can still do rollovers without locking out all VPN clients that haven’t recently done some (automatic or manual) provisioning update that isn’t standardized. And in the end, if a user treats/trusts a generic VPN service provider the same as an enterprise provisioning system, then we cannot define them to be different. That is, whatever you define as out of band, non-ike enterprise provisioning with be equally weak to this attack if provided by the generic VPN provider. Kittens all the way down. Paul > (It started writing that the zone could also be unsigned, but that obviously > doesn't work in the case of non-delegated "TLDs"...) > > W > > >> But in the end, it all depends on >> how badly you want your VPN service to see cute kittens. >> >> Paul > > > -- > I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad idea in > the first place. > This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing regret > at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair of pants. > ---maf
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