On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 09:20:54PM -0500, Michael Richardson wrote: > Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote: > > > yes, typo, "not for road-warrior" > > > > I understood. I disagree with the “not”. Road warriors using group psk is a > > thing, sadly. > > But they aren't cross-domain, they can do EAP-foobar, and they could use a > certificate without a lot of hassle about what set of trust anchors. > > If we stick to the site-to-site then I think we can do something rather > simple and quick, and our security considerations section will be much > simpler.
I mean, if road warriors should always be using either EAP or user certs, then we don't need PAKE for anything because presumably the shared keys used in PSKs are strong enough that PAKEs don't improve security and only slow things down... (I'm assuming you mean to use an EAP method like EAP-PWD (RFCs 5931 and 8146), yes?) Assuming you can always use EAP, the only real reasons to use a PAKE in IKEv2 are: - you're not entirely sure that you don't have weak PSKs and would like to strengthen them - you don't always want EAP for users who don't have certs for reasons that escape me (I wouldn't object, but if EAP fits the bill as to PAKE already, then thw WG could object to spending its resources on adding PAKE to IKEv2.) Right? Nico -- _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
