Hi Daniel,

I think we are on the same page on a number of items already.

There is only this "base station is an IoT use case" issue left.


Could you explain under what circumstances you consider a base station
being an IoT device (or even a constrained IoT use case)?


Ciao
Hannes

Am 17.12.2023 um 16:45 schrieb Daniel Migault:
Hi Hannes,

Please find my responses inline.

Yours,
Daniel

On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 9:45 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

    Hi Daniel,

    thanks for your response. See my response below.

    *From:*Daniel Migault <[email protected]>
    *Sent:* Dienstag, 12. Dezember 2023 15:20
    *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]>
    *Cc:* Hannes Tschofenig
    <[email protected]>; Carsten Bormann
    <[email protected]>; Tero Kivinen <[email protected]>; [email protected];
    [email protected]
    *Subject:* Re: [IPsec] WG Adoption calls for
    draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp and
    draft-mglt-ipsecme-ikev2-diet-esp-extension

    Hi Hannes,

    Seems I did not click "sent" yesterday. Please see my response inline.

    Yours,

    Daniel

    On Mon, Dec 11, 2023 at 12:02 PM Hannes Tschofenig
    <[email protected]> wrote:

        Hi Daniel, Hi all,

        don't get me wrong: I am trying to be helpful.

    This is how I am reading your comments.

        Integrating the functionality into SCHC alone is not enough.
        You need to integrate it into an implementation of IKEv2/IPsec
        that is suitable to the mentioned constrained IoT use cases. I
        have not seen IPsec/IKEv2 being used in constrained
        environments so far nor have I seen a "lightweight"
        implementation for microcontrollers.

    In our case, we want to "compress" / "decompress" IPsec traffic
    for our base stations. These could be seen as IoT in the sense
    that they are under heavy constraints... but I admit these are not
    sensors with a battery.

    [Hannes] Base Stations are not constrained IoT devices (see RFC
    7228 terminology). I assume that the base stations originate or
    terminate the traffic and the traffic being protected is some
    signaling protocol. If so, your co-workers, Magnus & John, who
    working on SCTP in the TSVWG, tell us that IPsec/IKEv2 is being
    phased out and replaced by TLS/DTLS. There is a design team
    working on this topic in the TSVWG. Hopefully your drafts are not
    taken over by the attempts to move telco infrastructure
    implementations into the cloud.


<mglt>
I am fine with the base station not being IoT - I said "could".

The interfaces we want to use diet-esp are fronthaul or sidehaul
related in our case are the Lower Layer Control (LLS), the low latency
coordination interface between RAN Compute basebands (E5 or Elastic
RAN in LTE). It is correct that these interfaces include the user plan.
On the other hand, I am pretty sure my co-workers did not mean to
say so and it is correct that DTLS may be used on on the midhaul and
inter Centralized Units interfaces such as CU-UP/CU-CP (E1), DU/CU-UP
(F1-C), DU/CU-UP(F1-C), CU-CP/CU-CP (Xn-C), CU-CP/AMF (N2).
</mglt>

    The advantage of using SCHC is that there is a SCHC protocol code
    points so we can have different layers of compressions and use the
    same framework for all layers (including applications). ESP is
    only one layer. The implementation of course needs
    compression/decompression to be integrated into IPsec. In our case
    mostly to adapt data structures accordingly and perform the actual
    compression / decompression. Suppose one field is removed. Some
    implementations build that field and remove it, others may simply
    not add that field. Doing one or the other depends on which
    hardware / software you are using.

    [Hannes] Your use case makes sense to me (if IPsec is still going
    to be used in this environment in the future). You should maybe
    add text about this use case to your document. This would provide
    a lot of extra context for the reader.

<mglt>
I agree. This context is currently not being mentioned as we were
mostly focused on the profile itself, but we will add some context.
</mglt>

    The feedback on the list in response to the call for adoption was
    confusing to me. Someone was saying “I could use it for ANIMA” and
    others said “I could use it for LPWAN”. I don’t believe those use
    cases are realistic.

        I have, however, heard about uses of WireGuard on Linux-based
        IoT devices (these are non-constrained devices, obviously)
        with the argument that it is simple to use and efficient.

        I believe it is worthwhile to think about the motivation of
        using WireGuard instead of IPsec/IKEv2 instead of spending a
        lot of time on yet another tiny optimization.

    For ESP, I have in mind wireguard performs 10 % / 15 % better in
    terms of throughput for Chacha and AES-GCM, but I do not know
    enough to tell if this is due to a specific setting or whether
    there is an implementation/systems reasons for it. I hardly see
    the packet format being an issue but of course I might be wrong.
    Of course if one can improve ESP we should do it and that is part
    of the evolution of ESP.

    [Hannes] Paul responded to this aspect already. I have not done an
    analysis but it would be good to talk about this topic in some
    document so that two sides of the story can be described.


<mglt>
I agree, but that seems to me a separate document.
</mglt>

        Hence, I would aim for a more ambitious goal: Make IPsec/IKEv2
        work well on Linux-based IoT devices (*)

    It would be interesting to understand what you think should be
    improved with the current IPsec/IKEv2. We have defined minimal
    versions of IKEv2/ESP that go into the simplification of the code.
    I think we could do more to ease the configuration, and probably
    the yang model that the WG are a good start - at least we are
    thinking of leveraging from these.

    [Hannes] I would like a document I could point to whenever I run
    into the next “Wireguard is so much better than IPsec” discussion.
    If, as part of this write-up, we find out that there are gaps, I
    would like those to be fixed. Reading Paul’s email, I think he is
    saying that there are not gaps. Everything is just fine.

<mglt>
It might be interesting and probably the topic of another thread. I
think wireguard positioned itself toward IPsec/IKEv2 which could be a
good starting point. I guess that is what makes it hard is that there
are multiple implementations/deployment of IPsec. </mglt>

    Ciao

    Hannes



--
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
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